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Therapist expertise is associated with the use of complex knowledge 
structures and metacognitive processes.  A cross sectional ex-post facto design 
assessed differences in structural knowledge and metacognitive processes b tw en 
lay helpers, advanced students, and senior professional therapists.  A card sorting task 
involving 19 therapist intentions was used to assess the following structural 
knowledge indicators: minutes to complete a card sort, number of card sort 
categories, and card sort score.  Metacognitive processes were assessed using an 
adaptation of the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory and the Self-reflection subscale 
of the Self-Reflection and Insight subscales.  An inverse U shaped relationship was 
found in where compared to lay helpers and senior professional therapists; advanced 
student’s had higher card sort scores, indicative of greater consistency with a sample 
of experienced therapists.  Compared to lay helpers and advanced students, senior 
professional therapists used significantly more time to sort therapist intentio s and 
sorted intentions into a greater number of categories. Relative to metacogniive
 process, advanced students and senior professional therapists reported significantly 
greater knowledge of cognition than lay helpers.  Also, advanced students also 
reported greater self-reflection than both lay helpers and senior professional 
therapists.  Discriminant analysis assessed the potential for a linear combination of 
structural knowledge indicators and metacognitive processes to differentiate 
participants by level of therapist development.  Self-reflection and card sort scores 
discriminated advanced students from senior professionals, whereas knowledge of 
cognition and minutes to complete the card sort discriminated experienced 
professionals from lay helpers.  Multidimensional scaling analysis was used to assess 
the optimal structural configuration of the pooled card sort data and yielded a 4 
dimensional solution of the 19 therapist intentions.  Results were consistent with 
Skovholt and Ronnestad’s (1992) model of therapist professional development.  
Results also supported the attenuating effect of ill defined problems on problem 
solving ability of highly experienced individuals in their respective domain.  The 
study concludes with implications for training, therapy, and research.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Expertise describes the characteristic knowledge and skills that distinguish 
exemplary performance from typical and mediocre performance.  Whether it is 
Beethoven’s 4th symphony, a Tiger Woods tee-shot landing 350 yards down a narrow 
tree-lined fairway, or the strategic moves of a chess master, what distingui hes highly 
skilled individuals in a domain from that of relatively less skilled individuals is 
complex and only recently beginning to be understood.   
Expertise research reflects the existing theory on the factors that distingui h 
highly skilled individuals from the less skilled.  Two general positions on expertise 
exist.  Chi (2006) describes one position as “absolute expertise.”  Proponents of the 
second position on expertise describe expertise as relative.  An absolute expertis  
paradigm assumes that individual differences in genetics or intelligence distinguish 
highly skilled individuals from less skilled individuals.  The failure of designated 
experts to maintain their exemplary performance across multiple domains (e.g., 
Stanley, George, & Solano, 1977; Terman & Oden, 1974) led theorists and 
researchers to question genetic and intelligence based notions of absolute expertise.   
Relative expertise emphasizes the role of domain specific experience.  The 
classic chess study of Adriaan de Groot (1966) represents the shift to relative 
expertise.  In interpreting the findings of this seminal study, De Groot attributed the 
superior performance of master chess players to an acquired ability to perceive and 
decode the deep structure among chess pieces into long-term memory.     
The idea that long-term memory or knowledge is organized or structured to 




research.  Prior knowledge and experience is critical to the development of relaive 
experience.  For example, prior knowledge of frequently encountered problems is 
represented by a schema or memory structure for typical problems.  A schema an be 
thought of as memories of frequently experienced problem situations used to interpret 
instances of related knowledge (Glaser, 1984, p. 100).  If relevant information is 
unavailable, problems solvers fill the schema with information available to them in 
their long-term memory from more familiar problem situations.  In other words, if a 
problem is of a familiar type it can trigger an appropriate problem schema and lead 
rapidly to an accurate solution.  However, if a problem is of an unfamiliar type, a 
more general schema is activated that contains general prescriptions for how t  
proceed.  In such cases, the solution will be more time consuming and more difficult 
to adequately solve.   
Relative to sub-experts, relative experts have access to a larger store of 
memorized and automated knowledge about problems and solutions within their 
domain (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Ericsson & Smith, 1991).  Harper, Jentsch, Berry, 
Lau, Bowers and Salas (2003) refer to these knowledge structures as structural 
knowledge, or an acquired and comprehensive representation of domain specific 
knowledge.  Positive relations between structural knowledge and problem solving 
(Chi & Glaser, 1985; Gordon & Gill, 1989) substantiate the importance of structural 
knowledge to expertise.   
Metacognition is a second variable frequently implicated in expertise (Paris & 




developmental psychologist John Flavell.  Flavell (1976) used the term metacognition 
to denote: 
“knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes and products or anything 
related to them (...) [and] refers, among other things, to the active monitoring and 
consequent regulation and orchestration of these processes (...), usually in the service 
of some concrete goal or objective.” (p. 232) 
  
Skilled individuals across various domains are equipped with a high degree of 
metacognitive knowledge and are strategic in monitoring and evaluating ther 
learning and performance (Brown, 1987; Gott, Lajoie, & Lesgold, 1991; Mayer, 
1999; Schoenfeld, 1987; Smith, Ford & Kozlowski, 1997).  Further, Chi (2000) 
postulated that metacognitive monitoring strategies are responsible for attenuating 
deficiencies in comprehension and task solution, in turn, allowing learners to amend 
mental representations of problems and their solution.   
Some evidence exists that highly skilled individuals in almost all domains: (a) 
have devoted much time and effort to their target domain and its relevant tasks 
(Davis, Curtis, & Tschetter, 2003; Ericsson & Smith, 1991), (b) possess an extensive 
body of coherently and efficiently organized domain knowledge (Harper, et al., 
2003), and (c) select and execute metacognitive strategies to deeply and effectively 
analyze problems and apply solutions (Brown, 1987; Glaser & Chi, 1988; Sternberg, 
1998). 
Despite the positive attributes associated with expertise; researchers cite a 
number of costs.  Potential costs associated with expertise include inflexibility, bias, 
and errors in judgment (Bedard & Chi, 1992; Castel, McCabe, Roediger, & Heitman, 
2007; Chi, 2006; Dumont, 1991).  Perhaps related, recent research in health related 




performance.  The “intermediate effect,” or when sub experts in a given domain 
outperform relative experts has been identified in several medical expertise studies 
(e.g., Hobus, Hofstra, Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1989; Remy, et al., 2002).   
Therapist Expertise: Structural Knowledge, Metacognition and Self-Reflection 
Therapist expertise involves the acquisition of therapy specific knowledge and 
skills (Rosenberg, 1997 as cited in Skovholt, 1997) and is observed in both cognitive-
behavioral (Kingdon, Tyrer, Seivewright, Ferguson, & Murphy, 1996), and 
psychodynamic (Barber, Crits-Christoph, & Luborsky, 1996) therapies.  Hillerbrand 
(1989) considered an expert therapist as “able to conceptualize clients, integrate 
factual information into performance, and recognize interpersonal processes” (p. 
292).  Jennings and Skovholt’s (1999) qualitative study of 10 peer-nominated master 
therapists identified three broad domains that characterized expert therapists.  
Jennings and Skovholt labeled domains of therapist expertise as cognitive, emotional, 
and relational.   
Similar to the cognitive sciences, theory (Blocher, 1983) and empirical 
research in counseling and psychotherapy training (e.g., Kivlighan, 2008; Mayfield, 
Kardash & Kivlighan, 1999; O’Byrne & Goodyear, 1977) support the notion that 
highly developed cognitive structures are fundamental to therapist expertise.  Blocher 
(1983) argued that the goal of counselor and therapist training is the “acquisition of 
new more complex and comprehensive schemas for understanding human interaction 
(p. 29)."  Furthermore, Blocher suggested that optimal counselor performance 
requires high levels of cognitive functioning.  Blocher outlined this cognitive 




the ability to take multiple perspectives…to differentiate among and 
manipulate a wide range and large numbers of relevant facts and causal factors…to 
integrate and synthesize in creative or unusual ways large amounts of 
information….[to engage] in this quest in active collaboration with the client 
(Blocher, 1983, p. 28).   
 
Metacognition has garnered increasing attention in the counseling and therapy 
training literature.  Fauth, Gates, Vinca, Boles and Hayes (2007) offered 
metacognitive processes of pattern recognition and mindfulness as one of the “big 
ideas in training (p. 385).”  Byers-Winston and Fouad (2006) outline the potential 
utility of metacognitive planning, monitoring, and evaluation in multiculturally 
competent career counseling.  
Self-reflection is a complex sequence of processes and has long been thought 
to play a significant role in therapist development.  Neufeldt, Karno, and Nelson 
(1996,) defined self-reflection as “a focused inquiry aimed toward attaining a 
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of phenomena encountered in one’s work 
(p 3).”  Neufeldt et al. derived the following four sequential categories of self-
reflection:  (a) causal conditions of new information and uncertainty; (b) intervening 
conditions of personality, cognitive capacity, and the training environment; (c) the 
search for understanding of phenomena during practice; and (d) long term change in 
trainee perception and behavior.  Skovholt and colleagues (Skovholt & Ronnestad, 
1992; Skovholt, Ronnestad & Jennings, 1997) posited that the attainment of therapist 
expertise requires a minimum of 10 years of reflective practice.  Ronnestad and 
Skovholt (2003) also predict development arrest without reflective practice. 
In summary, therapist expertise researchers have made notable progress in 




notion that therapist expertise involves the use of complex cognitive structures 
containing efficiently stored domain specific knowledge.  Implicated in the 
movement along the therapist expertise continuum are highly developed 
metacognitive processes of metacognition and self-reflection.  Furthermore, the 
attainment of therapist expertise is thought to require an absolute minimum of 10 
years of reflective practice.   
Statement of the Problem 
Although therapist expertise researchers have identified general knowledge 
structures and processes that distinguish therapists of different experience levels, few 
studies examine differences in structural knowledge and metacognitive processes 
among a sample that meaningful operationalizes the wide range of therapist 
experience levels.  For these reasons, a number of questions remain regarding the role 
of structural knowledge and metacognition n differentiating therapists at different 
levels of therapist expertise.  First, assuming that therapist expertise does exist; do 
therapists at different levels of experience demonstrate reliable differences in 
structural knowledge?  Secondly, although the therapist expertise literature theo izes 
the importance of metacognitive processes to therapist expertise; it rema ns unknown 
whether therapists at different experience levels demonstrate differences in 
metacognitive processes.  Finally, therapist expertise research (Skovholt & 
Ronnestad, 1992; Skovholt, et al., 1997) suggests that among other variables; a 
combination of both structural knowledge indicators (e.g., time to complete card sort, 
number of categories), and metacognitive processes differentiate therapists along the 




specific combination of structural knowledge and metacognitive processes that 
discriminate therapists of different experience levels.  Thus, a third question about the 
nature is what linear combination of structural knowledge indicators and 
metacognitive processes best distinguish individuals along the therapist experience 
continuum?  
Rationale for the Study 
The expertise paradigm of cognitive psychology provides an abundance of 
information useful to studying differences across levels of therapist experi nce.  A 
standard paradigm for studying domain specific expertise differences is protocol 
analysis.  Protocol analysis presents a problem to individuals of varying levels of 
experience, and subsequently systematically compares their performance (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993).  Despite existing methods of assessing differences in structural 
knowledge and metacognitive processes among individuals of different experience, 
several challenges exist to doing so in the psychotherapy domain. 
One challenge to studying structural knowledge differences in therapist of 
varying experience levels involves choosing a task that is uniformly difficult for 
therapists at various points along the experience continuum.  Structural knowledge 
can be assessed through the use of two general categories of tasks: in rinsic or 
contrived tasks (Chi, 2006).  Intrinsic tasks are familiar to what experts do when they 
are doing their jobs.  The use of intrinsic tasks (Chi, Glaser, & Reese, 1982; 
Feltovich, Johnson, Moller, & Swanson, 1984) typically revealed that relative experts 
are faster and more error free than relative novices.  Alternatively, relative experts 




typically asked to perform.  Four types of contrived tasks exist: recalling, perceiving, 
categorizing, and verbal reporting.  The use of contrived tasks in expertise research 
can have several advantages.  First, a contrived task can be undertaken just as 
competently by a novice as an expert.  More importantly, a contrived task is le s 
biased toward individuals with greater experience.  For these reasons, contrived tasks 
can be considered more stringent tests of expertise than intrinsic tasks.   
A second challenge to meaningfully studying structural knowledge differenc s 
in therapist of varying experience levels is the limited availability of empirically 
supported therapy-specific concepts valued by therapists of various theoretical 
orientations (Horowitz & Malle, 1993).  For example, therapists who identify as 
primarily cognitive in orientation may prioritize concepts related to “cognitive 
distortions” and use techniques such as “thought stopping,” and “distraction.”  In 
contrast, Schneider (2003) suggested that a therapist who identifies as existential-
humanistic might prioritize concepts related to “therapeutic presence” ad rely much 
more heavily on interpersonal techniques such as “recognition of transference” and 
“countertransference projections.” 
The issue of differentiation (Dawes, 1994) is a third challenge to studying 
differences in structural knowledge among therapists of different experienc  l vels.  
The use of arbitrary developmental level distinctions exemplifies the differentiation 
problems of many therapist expertise studies.  For example, Skovholt, Ronnestad, and 
Jennings (1997) cited the use of convenience samples of master’s practicum students 




continuum.  Small differences in years of experience often obscure differences 
between therapists of varying levels of expertise. 
Studying differences in metacognitive processes among therapists of different 
experience levels is also challenging.  First, no therapy specific method of assessing 
therapist metacognition has been developed.  Second, despite the often-cited role of 
self-reflection to therapist expertise, construct operationalization and measurement 
issues contribute to the lack of validating data on the relationship between self-
reflection and therapist experience level.  Most existing measures of self-reflection 
fail to operationalize adequately the depth and breadth of self-reflection described by 
Neufeldt, et al. (1996).  Two of the most prominent self-reflection measures in 
psychotherapy research, the Private Self-Consciousness Scale (PrSCS; Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRS; Trapnell 
& Campell, 1999) have been shown to correlate positively with measures of 
psychopathology (i.e., rumination), and may be measuring a dysfunctional type of 
self absorption rather than constructive self-reflection (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 
1996).  In an attempt to improve on some of the psychometric drawbacks of the 
PrSCS and the RRS, Grant, Franklin and Langford (2002) devised the Self-reflection 
and Insight Scale (SRIS) which defines self-reflection as the inspection and 
evaluation of one’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.  However, validity findings 
(Grant et al., 2001) indicated that similar to the PrSCS and the RSS, the self-
reflection scale of the SRIS may also measure a dysfunctional rumination or self 




In sum, existing challenges to studying structural knowledge differences 
among therapists of varying levels of expertise includes the decision to choose a 
contrived versus a familiar task, identification of representative domain specific 
concepts, and inadequate operationalization of the therapist experience continuum.  
Challenges to studying the role of metacognitive processes in therapists’ expertise 
include the lack of a therapy specific method of assessing therapist metacognition and 
questionable validity of existing self-reflection measures.  
Purpose of the Study 
The present study has several purposes.  The first purpose is to assess 
differences in structural knowledge for therapists at three sufficiently differentiated 
points along the therapist experience continuum.  Ronnestad and Skovholt (2003)  
identified the following six phases of therapist development: (a) lay helper, (b) 
beginning student, (c) advanced student, (d) novice professional, (e) experienced 
professional, and (f) senior professional.  The present study operationalizes the 
therapist experience continuum by sampling lay helpers, advanced students, and 
senior professional therapists. Lay helpers represent the novice end of the expertis  
continuum, and have yet to enter graduate level professional training.  The advanced 
student group represents the intermediate point along the experience continuum.  
Advanced students are often at the conclusion of academic training and are often 
gaining practicum or internship experience where they receive regular formalized 
supervision.  The senior professional therapist group represents the expert end of th  
experience continuum.  Many senior professional therapists possess 20 years or more 




The Hill and O’Grady (1985) list of therapist intentions will be used in a 
contrived (sorting) task to assess participants’ structural knowledge.  The therapist 
intentions list was chosen for the present study for three reasons.  First, the therapist 
intentions list has high face validity.  According to Hill and O’Grady, the therapist 
intentions list represents “what therapists want to accomplish through their in sss on 
behavior” and refer to the “cognitive component that mediates the choice of 
intervention” (pg. 3).  Secondly, therapist intentions have been found to be highly 
predictive of actual therapist behaviors.  Significant associations between therapist 
intentions and response modes have been found to exist for therapists of a wide 
variety of theoretical orientations (Elliott, 1986; Hill & O’Grady, 1985).  Finally, the 
maximum number of entities, which is conveniently manageable for most card sorts, 
is about 20 (Rugg and McGeorge, 2005).  Therefore, the number of intentions (19) 
represents a manageable number of sorting entities. 
The second purpose of this study is to assess for differences in metacognitive 
processes across the therapist experience continuum.  To examine differences in 
metacognitive processes across therapists of different experience levels, the present 
study used the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory therapist Form (MAI-TF), a self 
report measure of metacognition specially developed for the present study and the
Self-reflection and Insight Scales (SRIS, Grant et al., 2001). 
The continuum of therapist experience level extends from zero to thirty or 
more years of experience and consists of variability in structural knowledge and 




linear combination of structural knowledge indicators and metacognitive processes 
differentiate therapists along the experience continuum.   
Research Questions 
 Accordingly, this study addressed the following research questions: 
Research Q. 1 Are indicators of structural knowledge significantly different  
between groups of lay helpers, advanced students, and  
senior professional therapists? 
Research Q. 2 Are metacognition and self-reflection scores significantly different 
between groups of lay helpers, advanced students, and senior 
professional therapists? 
Research Q. 3 What linear combination of structural knowledge indicators and  
metacognitive processes discriminate therapists along the  
experience continuum of lay helper, advanced student, and senior 
professional therapists?  
Significance of the Study 
The present study is significant for a number of reasons.  The self-regulated 
nature of the therapy profession and its’ significant potential to influence lives 
upholds the important responsibility to train effective therapists.  Results of this study 
will contribute to the understanding of variation in the cognitive organization of 
therapist intentions and perceived metacognitive processes among lay helpers, 
advanced students, and senior professional therapists.  These results may have 
implications for training and supervision activities that promote development of 




may also lay the groundwork for future research exploring relations between 
structural knowledge, metacognitive processes, and other important variables 





















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The purpose of this literature review is to familiarize the reader with important 
concepts and results of studies related to structural knowledge, metacognition, and 
self-reflection.  The literature on structural knowledge assessment is the first area 
reviewed and emphasizes review of the card sorting method of structural knowledge 
assessment.  The role of problem structure and expertise development in the domains 
of physics and medical education, and counseling and psychotherapy are also 
reviewed.  The second area of literature covers major trends in the conceptualization 
of metacognition and includes a section describing the development and validation of 
the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI, Schraw & Dennison, 1994).  This 
section also integrates theoretical literature related to metacognition and therapeutic 
competence.  The third area of literature reviewed will be theory and research on 
counselor and therapist development.  Three models of counselor and therapist 
development will be reviewed with an emphasis on the role of self-reflection in 
counselor and therapist expertise development.     
Structural Knowledge 
Review of the cognitive science literature is replete with overlapping 
definitions for structural knowledge.  Structural knowledge has been defined in many 
ways in the literature. Shavelson (1972) referred to structural knowledge as “the 
organization of long-term memory concepts (pp. 226-227).”  Functional definitions 
characterize structural knowledge as a type of knowledge that facilitates the 
translation of relevant domain knowledge into procedural knowledge (Jonassen, 




interrelated representations of declarative knowledge that facilitate procedures.  The 
most discernible definition is that structural knowledge is the way individuals 
organize important concepts, rules, and procedures that characterize a domain of 
practice (Davis, Curtis, & Tschetter, 2003; Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993; Naveh-
Benjamin, et al., 1986).   
Structural Knowledge Assessment 
A key premise of structural knowledge assessment is that knowledge is 
relational (Davis & Yi, 2004).  Accordingly, structural assessment involves: (a) 
obtaining judgments of the relationship between concepts; (b) defining some 
representation or cognitive structure based on these judgments; and (c) evaluating the 
derived knowledge structure by comparing it against a referent structure (Goldsmith 
& Kraiger, 1997).   
Various methods exist to assess structural knowledge.  Harper et al. (2003)
term these methods as structural knowledge elicitation techniques.  Frequently us d 
knowledge elicitation techniques include similarity ratings, relationship judgments, 
free recall, and card sorting.  Each of these methods requires individuals to make 
judgments of the similarities among domain specific concepts.  The next section will 
review literature on the reliability and validity of the card sort method of structural 
knowledge assessment. 
Card sorting 
Card sorting techniques are aligned with Kelly’s (1955) personal construct 
theory and assumes that people can describe their own categorization of the w rld 




research has validated the use of card sorts to assess structural knowledge.  Tessmer, 
Perrin, and Bennett (1998) studied the reliability of card sorts and concluded that card 
sorts produce stable and coherent measures of structural knowledge.  Evans, Hitt, and 
Jentsch (2001) obtained results of moderate to high test-re-test reliabilities (r = .50) of 
repeated card sorts, implying that participant’s knowledge structure is similar each 
time the assessment is repeated.  Fiore, Fowlkes, Martin-Milham, and Oser (2000) 
assessed the construct validity of card sorting by comparing it with similarity ratings 
using Pathfinder methodology (Schvaneveldt, 1990) and found that both techniques 
are comparable when used to assess expert aviator’s knowledge structures.  Cheatham 
and Lane (2002) found that card sorts are an efficient way of capturing structural 
information and may be a better predictor of performance than other knowledge 
elicitation tasks measured in their study.   
Card sorts yield a variety of reliable quantitative indices useful in assessing 
structural knowledge differences (Deibel & Anderson, 2005; McGeorge & Rugg, 
1992) and have been widely used to assessing experience based performance 
differences in children and adults (e.g., Chi, Glaser, & Reese, 1982; Gobbo et al., 
1986; McCauley, et al., 2005; Van de Wiel, Boshuizen, Schmidt, & Schaper, 1999). 
Problem Structure and Structural Knowledge Assessment in Physics and 
Medical Education 
The present section examines research in physics and medical education 
literature to highlight the impact of problem structure on structural knowledge 




Chi, Glaser, and Reese (1982) conducted two studies in order to assess 
problem categorization differences by level of expertise.  The first study required 
physics Ph.D. students (relative experts) and undergraduate students who have taken 
one mechanics course (relative novices) to categorize physics problems based on 
similarity of problem solution.  Due to their greater years of experience and use of 
concepts (physics problems) assumed to be familiar; the authors hypothesized that 
Ph.D. students compared to undergraduate students would demonstrate better 
structural knowledge  as evidenced by fewer problem categories and increased 
efficiency in categorizing problems.  No significant differences were found in the 
number of problem categories produced by each group or amount of time taken to 
categorize problems.  Although no quantitative experience level differences wer  
found between the two participant groups; examination of two pairs of problems the 
majority of participants at both experience levels categorized together found 
differences in verbal justifications of the two categories.  Ph.D. student’s verbal 
justifications implicated the use of deep level features, but justifications given by 
undergraduate students implicated surface level features.  For example, Chi et al. 
(1982, pp 125) found that Ph.D. student’s justifications implicated physics laws such 
as conservation of energy and Newton’s law of physics while undergraduate student’s 
justifications implicated simple concepts such as “rotational things,” “blocks,” and 
“inclines planes.”  
Contrary to the author’s hypothesis, quantitative differences were not found in 
the number of categories generated and time to complete the categorization.  The 




expertise continuum.  It is unlikely that Ph.D. students represent the expert end of the 
physics expertise continuum.  Furthermore, findings from this study underscore the 
importance of examining descriptive features of structural knowledge data in ddition 
to quantitative indicators of structural knowledge.    
Chi et al. (1981) attempted to replicate the finding that physics Ph.D. students 
would categorize physics problems based on deep structured (e.g., physics 
principles), but novices would categorize physics problems based on surface structure 
(e.g., objects or key words described in the problem).  To better differentiate the 
physics developmental continuum, Chi et al. hypothesized that categorizations made 
by advanced novice students would combine deep and surface features of physics 
problems.  The research hypotheses were confirmed.  Novices categorized physics
problems based on key physics words within the problem set, and Ph.D. students 
categorized problems based on underlying physics principles. As hypothesized, 
advanced novice students categorized problems using a mix of surface and deep 
structure.  Advanced novices categorized problems by underlying physics prin iples 
while simultaneously separating them according to surface features of the problems.  
The authors interpreted these findings to mean that with learning; there is a gradu l 
shift in organization of knowledge from one centering on surface level components of 
the problem to one where there is a combined reliance on surface and deep level 
components of physics problems.  These results imply a positive relationship between 
higher experience level and more well developed structural knowledge.   
Medical expertise development has been conceptualized by structural changes 




Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990; Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993).  Schmidt et al.’s (1993) 
model of expertise development suggests that learner’s progress through a series of 
three phases characterized by functionally different knowledge structures.  Th  first 
phase is characterized by the accumulation of basic knowledge of medical illnesses 
that explain the causes and consequences of disease in terms of basic 
pathophysiological processes.  At the second stage, through experience with actual 
cases; declarative knowledge accumulated in the first stage becomes cpiled into 
higher-level causal models explaining signs and symptoms, which are subsumed 
under diagnostic labels.  In other words, knowledge is reorganized into narrative 
structures called illness scripts (Schmidt et al., 1993).   
Illness scripts contain information including: “enabling conditions” or factors 
making occurrence of a disease more likely (e.g., risk factors), “predisposing factors” 
(e.g., family history), “boundary conditions” (e.g., age, sex), “faults” (e.g., description 
of the malfunction), and “consequences” (e.g., signs and symptoms arising from the 
fault).  Illness scripts, because they develop through experience are thought to be 
highly idiosyncratic in nature (Schmidt et al., 1993).  Expert physician clinical 
reasoning is based to a large extent on the similarity between the presenting situation 
and some previous illness script available from memory (Schmidt et al., 1993).  In the
final stage, memory for previous patient encounters is retained as individual entities 
as expert physicians begin to store patient encounters as “instance scripts.”   
Knowledge encapsulation has been the topic of several research studies.  Van 
de Wiel, et al. (1999) asked experienced physicians, advanced students, and medical 




Resulting protocols of experienced medical doctors contained more elaborate and 
fluent explanations than those of clerks and medical students.  These results imply 
that experts apply densely integrated encapsulated knowledge while sub experts apply 
detailed and procedural knowledge.  There is also evidence to suggest that experts 
and novices differ in their use of biomedical versus encapsulated knowledge in 
making a diagnosis.  Schmidt, Hobus, Patel, and Boshuizen (1987) investigated the 
role of enabling conditions of a clinical case (age, previous illness, and family
history) in diagnostic skill among novice and expert family practitioners.  The authors 
found that expert family practitioners compared to novice family practitioners showed 
superior diagnostic skills when presented with slides containing a picture of the 
patient and information about the patient’s profession, previous diseases, medication, 
and marital status compared to when they were presented with the patient's complaint 
alone (38% vs. 27%).   
Problem structure is an important determinant of medical expertise (Chi & 
Glaser, 1985; Gagne, Yekovitch & Yekovitch, 1993).  Highlighting the impact of 
problem structure on medical expertise, Hobus, Hofstra, Boshuizen, and Schmidt 
(1989) discovered that when information about enabling conditions was not presented 
to experienced physicians; their diagnostic performance was no better than that of 
novice physicians.  These findings suggest that the performance of individuals with 
greater experience is compromised with structural knowledge assessment involving 
contrived tasks.  Experienced physicians rely on enabling conditions of case 
information in order to activate relevant problem solving schemas or illness scripts.  




significantly better than physicians with little experience.  (Remy, et al., 2002) asked 
experts from two disciplines (cardiologists and pulmonologists) to diagnose, recall, 
and explain the signs and symptoms of four clinical cases: two cases were in the 
domain of cardiology and two were in the pulmonology discipline.  Therefore, 
cardiologists and pulmonologists fulfilled both the relative expert and relative novice 
roles.  Cardiologists and pulmonologists alike were faster and more accurate 
diagnosing cases within their specialties.  Findings were explained by familiarity of 
the clinical cases.  When processing a case outside of one’s domain; participants were 
limited in their ability to use encapsulated knowledge and thus used more time to 
diagnose the problems, albeit with less accuracy than relative experts.   
Structural Knowledge Assessment in Counseling and Psychotherapy  
Historically, a major challenge for counseling and psychotherapy training 
researchers is the identification of cognitive developmental variables that expl in 
differences found between skilled and less skilled therapists.  Furthermore; probl m 
structure, or the degree of definition (ill-defined versus well-defined) is an important 
factor to consider when interpreting structural knowledge assessment results (Chi & 
Glaser, 1985; Gagne, et al., 1993). The present section will review and critique 
studies on counselor and therapist’s structural knowledge assessment relative to 
problem structure. 
Martin, Martin, Mayer, and Slemon (1986) employed a stimulus recall method 
to examine relations among counselor and client cognitions, behaviors, and ratings of 
session quality in 29 counseling sessions involving 10 different counselor-client 




were thinking during eight instances of counselor behavior.  Stimulated recall results
indicated that novice counselors rated themselves as working harder than did 
experienced counselors; a finding that may indicate experienced counselor’s 
acquisition of more automatic, and less effortful modes of information processing and 
problem solution.  These findings are consistent with the expertise literature which 
suggests that relative experts are quicker and expend less effort during task solution, 
particularly when asked to solve familiar tasks.   
Hillerbrand and Claiborn (1990) studied differences in cognitive processes 
used by counselors of varying experience levels during diagnostic decisions.  
Doctoral level professionals with over five years of professional experience were 
designated as experts.  Novices were graduate students in Counseling Psychology 
with between one and three semesters of clinical experience and one course in 
diagnostic assessment.   
Participants were given three different psychological cases.  The cases 
differed in degree of structure from “well-structured,” “ill-structred,” and “random-
structured.”  The well-structured case contained information that was clearly and 
specifically related to a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.  This case did not 
include any information that related to other Axis 1 or Axis 2 disorders.  The ill-
structured case included some clear information related to a diagnosis of depression 
but also included contradictory and diagnostically irrelevant information.  The 
random-structured case was made up of randomly selected symptoms from the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III (DSM-III).  Participants 




hypothesized that relative experts would perform better than relative novices when 
forming responses to the well-structured case but would perform no better with the 
ill-structured and random-structured cases. 
Results showed that experts were more accurate in making diagnoses for the 
case in which diagnostic information was considered well structured while novices 
had more difficulty assigning an accurate diagnosis (Hillerbrand & Claiborn 1990). 
As was hypothesized, experts were no more accurate than novices in forming 
diagnoses for the ill-structured and random-structured cases.  The researchrs 
concluded that experts generated more accurate diagnoses for the well structured case 
because they were able to access information previously stored in their “diagnost c 
schema” to make sense of well-organized diagnostic-related information.  However, 
as case information became less clear, experts’ ability to make diagnostic decisions 
was no better than novices (Hillerbrand & Claiborn, 1990). 
Martin, Slemon, Hiebert, Hallberg, and Cummings (1989) used a cognitive 
mapping technique (CMT) to study the effect of experience level on case 
conceptualizations using two conditions.  In the first condition, participants made 
conceptual associations in response to the stimulus sentence:  “Generally speaking, 
what happens to help clients change during counseling?”  In the second condition, 
participants made conceptual associations concerning “specific” problems of 
individual clients in reference to the stimulus sentence:  “What are the most imporant 
things to consider with respect to the client’s problems?”  The first condition is 
considered to be ill structured as the problem structure in the second condition 




problem condition also appears more structured as it identifies the specific constraint: 
“what should be considered with respect to the client’s problems?”  In contrast, the 
general probe condition does not provide information about an initial or a desired 
state and is absent of any specific constraints. 
Participant’s cognitive maps were scored for extent (number of concepts 
generated), conceptual integration (average number of links per concept), and degree 
of hierarchical organization (number of super-ordinate clusters).  Multiple analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) revealed no main effects for years of experience or stimulus 
probe type.  However, a statistically reliable two way (counselor experience x 
stimulus probe type) interaction effect was found on scores for the number of 
concepts measured F (1, 35) = 6.69, p = .01.  Mean scores for conceptualizing general 
counseling process were 8.30 and 8.54 for novice and experienced counselors, 
respectively.  However, mean scores for conceptualizing the counseling process with 
a specific client problem was 9.11 for novice counselors and 7.96 for experienced 
counselors.  Martin et al. (1989) interpreted this result as consistent with previous 
findings that the greater number of concepts produced by the novice counselors for 
the specific client problem indicated that they had yet to develop highly refined, 
domain-specific schemas to use for describing client specific issues.  By contrast, 
experienced counselors used fewer concepts in the specific client condition because 
they possessed the schemas necessary for parsimoniously characterizing the client.  
These results underscore the impact of problem structure on counselor and therapist 




To study differences between experienced counselors and novice counselors 
knowledge structures about clients, Mayfield, Kardash and Kivlighan (1999) 
attempted to control for some of the methodological limitations of the Martin et al. 
(1989) study by having both experienced and novice counselors read the same 
transcript of an initial counseling session.  Participants sorted a set of cards each 
containing a single statement from the transcript into piles.  After the sort; 
participants labeled each pile as well as the relationships among cards in each pil .  
Participant data were analyzed with respect to experience level differences in the 
amount of time spent on the CMT, the number of concepts generated, and the 
structural quality of cognitive maps.   
Mann Whitney U tests revealed that experienced counselors were significantly 
faster at reading the transcript and sorting transcript statements.  No significant 
differences were found to exist between experienced and novice counselors in the 
time spent making the cognitive map.  Consistent with the finding from the Martin et 
al. (1989) study; cluster analysis indicated that novices (a) constructed simplistic 
representations containing few reciprocal links between categories, (b) had more 
concept categories and (c) formed categories based on surface features.  These results 
support the information-processing perspective that novices attend more to surface 
detail and require greater time to process information; which is indicative of relatively 
inferior structural knowledge.   
O’Byrne and Goodyear (1997) examined the amount and type of information 
expert and novice psychologists sought to form a clinical impression of a vignette of a 




Novices were graduate students in psychology who reported a mean of 1.8 years 
professional experience; experienced therapists were peer-nominated counseling 
center psychologists with a mean of 13 years experience.  Results suggested that 
experience level may affect both the amount and type of information sought by 
participants.  On average, counseling center psychologists requested significantly 
more information compared to graduate students (23.1 vs. 14.9 questions).  
Counseling center psychologists were found to focus less on crisis aspects of the 
client situation (56.5 vs. 64.4%).  This finding is consistent with expertise research in 
that experienced professionals are believed to examine a greater number of 
hypotheses compared to less experienced practitioners.  That is; if experts hav  more 
numerous schemata against which to compare client information, they are likely to 
require more information about the client to determine the "goodness-of-fit" with 
existing cognitive structures.  Specifically, ill structured problems tend o require 
more experienced participants to use more time and result in greater categories.  In 
contrast, better defined problems tend to result in experienced participants arriving to 
solutions more quickly and with the use of fewer categories.     
Researchers have also examined qualitative features of therapist structural 
knowledge.  Hill and O’Grady (1985) sampled 42 experienced therapists with an 
average of 10 years of post internship experience to examine the structural 
configuration of therapist intentions within and across therapy sessions.  MDS 
analysis uncovered a two dimensional solution that accounted for 83% of the 
variance.  The first dimension reflected Support-Assessment versus Change, the 




examination of the MDS solution by Hill and O’Grady indicated that “insight” and 
“feelings” were often used together, tapping what these authors referred to as 
“emotional insight” (p. 16).  Therapist intentions were found to vary similarly within 
and across sessions (Hill & O’Grady, 1985).  Specifically, intentions of “set limits,” 
“get information,” “support,” “clarify,” “hope,” and “cathart,” decreased with time 
while “insight,” “change,” and “reinforce change” increased with time.   
Kivlighan (2008) examined trainees’ pattern of intention use and changes in 
structural knowledge of intentions as a result of academic training.  Furthermore, the 
authors assessed the degree to which trainee’s pattern of intention use and structural 
knowledge of intentions converge with that of experienced therapists and relate to 
client rated outcome (smoothness and depth).  Results found that only trainee’s 
procedural structural knowledge changed from pre-training to post-training, 
becoming more similar to the structure of intentions use of the experienced therapists.  
When trainees’ structure of intention use was more similar to that of experienced 
counselors, their clients rated counseling sessions as smoother at both pre- and post-
training and deeper at post-training only. 
Examination of participant’s semantic networks found notable differences 
when comparing trainee’s semantic networks to that of experienced therapists.  
Intentions of “feelings,” “insight,” and “clarify” were central in both novice and 
experienced organization of intentions use.  For experienced counselors, the relatively 
high use of these intentions was in conjunction with other intentions.  For novices, the 




(2008) concluded that experienced counselors used the feelings, insight, and clarify 
intentions along with other intentions to further the counseling process. 
Metacognition 
Metacognition is one of the most actively investigated cognitive processes in 
contemporary developmental and instructional psychology research (Tobias & 
Everson, 2000).  The empirical study of metacognition can be traced to two domains:  
reading comprehension (Alexander & Jetton, 2000; Guthrie & Wigfield, 1999; 
Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995) and academic problem solving (Baker & Brown, 1984).  
The current section examines two models of metacognition:  Flavell’s (1979) model 
of cognitive monitoring and Baker and Brown’s (1984) metacognitive model.   
Models of Metacognition  
Flavell’s (1979) model of cognitive monitoring describes the interactions 
among four metacognitive components: (a) metacognitive knowledge, (b) 
metacognitive experiences, (c) cognitive strategies and (d) cognitive goals.  Figure 1 
depicts the components of metacognition and the relations between them as stated by 






Figure 1. Flavell (1979) Model of Cognitive Monitoring 
Metacognitive knowledge consists of knowledge about three categories and 
their interaction: (a) the person category, (b) the task category, and (c) the strategy 
category.  The person category consists of beliefs about the nature of self as a 
cognitive processor (e.g., the realization that one is better at mathematical 
calculations than at memorizing historical events).  The tasks category considers the 
information available to solve the problem as well as information about demands of 
the specific cognitive tasks.  In this category, one would find understanding of the 
implications of the way information is presented.  The strategy category consists of 
knowledge about which strategies are likely to be effective for achieving task goals.   
Metacognitive experiences function to monitor strategic task related decision 
making cognitive processing as they take place (Flavell, 1979).  Feelings of 




experiences that contribute to the use of metacognitive strategies (Efklides & Petkaki, 
2005).  Flavell concluded that metacognitive experiences are more likely to happen in 
situations that demand careful and highly conscious reflective thinking, planning, or 
where decisions and actions are weighty, risky, and not predetermined.  Cognitive 
strategies refer to the utilization of specific techniques that assist in achieving 
cognitive goals.  Cognitive goals describe the chosen path one chooses to manage the 
task.   
Metacognitive knowledge and monitoring and control processes follow 
different developmental trajectories.  The available empirical data (Flavell, 1985 cited 
in Garner & Alexander, 1989; Kreutzer, Leonard & Flavell, 1975) suggests that 
metacognitive knowledge develops incrementally as a function of time.  In some 
domains, a high degree of metacognitive monitoring is difficult for adults to sustain 
(Markman, 1981; Glenberg, Wilkinson & Epstein, 1982).   
Brown (1987) described metacognition as an awareness of one’s own 
cognitive activity; the methods employed to regulate one’s own cognitive processes; 
and a command of how one directs, plans, and monitors cognitive activity.  Baker and 
Brown’s (1984) model of metacognition divides metacognition into two broad 
distinguishable yet closely related categories: Knowledge of Cognition and 
Regulation of Cognition.  For example, knowledge of cognition is thought to be 
statable and age dependent, while regulation of cognition is thought to be less statable





Figure 2. Baker and Brown’s (1984) Model of Metacognition. 
Knowledge of cognition refers to what individuals know about their own 
cognition and includes three different kinds of metacognitive knowledge: (a) 
declarative, (b) procedural, and (c) conditional (Brown, 1987; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; 
Schraw & Moshman, 1995).  Declarative knowledge refers to knowing “about” things 
and includes knowledge about oneself as a learner and about the factors that influence 
learning.  Procedural knowledge refers to knowledge about the execution of 
procedural skills.  Pressley, Borkowski, and Schneider (1987) suggested that 
individuals with high procedural skills are more likely to sequence problem-solving 
strategies effectively.  Chi et al. (1989) suggested that individuals with high 
procedural skills use qualitatively different strategies to solve problems.  Conditional 
knowledge refers to knowing the “why” and “when” aspects of cognition and can be 
thought of as the declarative knowledge about the relative utility of cognitive 
procedures.  Schraw and Dennison (1994) suggested that knowledge of cognition 




improves performance.  Regulation of cognition is thought to refer to processes or 
mechanisms that help control and monitor thinking, performance, and subsequent 
learning.   
Brown (1987) specifically delineated four components of metacognition: (1) 
planning, (2) monitoring, (3) evaluating, and (4) revising.  Metacognitive planning 
refers to the deliberate activities that organize the entire learning process and consist 
of establishing the learning goal, learning sequence, learning strategies, and expected 
learning time.  Examples include, making predictions, strategy sequencing, and 
allocating time and attention selectively before beginning a task.  Secondly, 
metacognitive monitoring refers to the activities that moderate the current progress of 
learning.  An example of metacognitive monitoring involves periodic self-testing.  
Research indicates that monitoring ability occurs quite slowly and is quite poor in 
adults (Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen & Roedel, 1995).  Metacognitive evaluation refers 
to appraising the products and regulatory processes of learning, thinking, and 
performance.  Metacognitive revising involves modifying previous learning 
approaches, goals, and task related strategies.  Baker and Brown’s (1984) model of 
metacognition is particularly suitable for research purposes because it enables a focus 
on specific components of knowledge and regulation of cognition relevant for 
problem solving.   
Metacognition research indicates that the more metacognitive one is; the more 
strategic and successful one is likely to be in cognitive tasks (Garner & Alexander, 
1989; Pressley et al., 1987).  Pressley et al. (1987) argued that compared to poor 




their approaches to problems, have a larger database of knowledge concerning the 
circumstances that make different strategies appropriate, and do more strategic 
monitoring and regulation of strategy use to ensure that activities are carried out in 
the appropriate sequence.  Davidsson, Mitchell, Mitchell and Smith (2006) 
investigated how entrepreneurial metacognition impacts entrepreneurial expertise.  
The authors sampled two groups.  The treatment group consisted of 233 masters and 
undergraduate students in a four-month entrepreneurship program who were exposed 
to a metacognitively-based curriculum.  The control group consisted of 67 business 
students enrolled in an entrepreneurship course that did not consist of metacognitive 
elements.  The expertise of students receiving the metacognitive treatment increased 
at a significantly higher rate than the students not receiving the treatment.   
Metacognition may be particularly sensitive to the Dunning-Kruger Effect 
(Kruger & Dunning, 1999), a cognitive bias in which the less skilled rate their own 
ability as much higher than it actually is, while the highly skilled underrate their 
abilities.  The Dunning-Kruger effect is interpreted as a lack of metacognitive ability 
to recognize one’s incompetence.  Students, particularly those in the lowest first and 
second quartiles of actual performance have been found to overestimate their mastery
of material and test performance, (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003.   
Measuring Metacognition  
One of the most difficult problems facing researchers interested in 
metacognition is identifying metacognitively aware individuals quickly and reliably 
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994).  Several issues pertain to the difficulty of assessing 




Secondly, the concept pertains to internal cognitive processes that are difficult to 
observe, and often out of conscious awareness.  For these reasons, few 
psychometrically viable methods of assessing metacognition exist.  Existing 
assessment methods can be prohibitive in most applied settings due to the amount of 
time and effort necessary for administration.  For example, Swanson’s (1990) method 
of assessing metacognition asks individuals to respond individually to a series of 17 
open-ended questions intended to assess metacognitive knowledge.  Although 
reliable, Swanson’s method places excessive demands on researchers and their 
participants.  The next section will review the initial development and validation of a 
domain general metacognition inventory, the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory 
(MAI, Schraw & Dennison, 1994).   
The MAI was initially divided into eight theoretical components; three of 
which assess knowledge of cognition (declarative, procedural, and conditional) and 
five of which assess regulation of cognition (planning, monitoring, evaluation of 
learning, information management strategies, and debugging strategies).  Knowledge 
of cognition measures knowledge of one’s strengths and weaknesses about strategie  
and when and why certain strategies should be used.  Regulation of cognition 
measures knowledge about planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating 
strategy use. 
Schraw and Dennison (1994) conducted two experiments to develop and test 
the reliability and validity of the MAI.  In the first study an unrestricted factor 
analyses orthogonal (uncorrelated) and oblique (correlated) was initially performed to 




Both analyses produced six factor solutions with Eigen values greater than one that 
recovered 78% of the sample variance.  Factor loadings for each solution were almost 
identical, however the oblique solution indicated that each pair of factors was 
correlated in excess of r = .30.  
Inspection of the oblique and orthogonal six factor solutions revealed that 
neither corresponded to the eight hypothesized subscales described above.  The first 
two factors included most of the knowledge of cognition items.  Factor three through 
six included most of the regulation of cognition items.  Six items had loadings less 
than .45 on both factors.  Three items failed to load on either factor.  In addition, 
coefficient alphas for five of the six factors were below desired criterion of .80 (e.g., 
.81, .74, .71, .66, .65, & .59 respectively).  Overall, the unrestricted factor solutions 
did not lead to a highly reliable eight-factor solution. 
Schraw and Dennison (1994) conducted a forced two-factor solution to 
compare whether the two factors corresponded to the knowledge of and regulation of 
cognition factors.  Factor loadings for the restricted (two factor) solutions (oblique 
and orthogonal) resulted in virtually identical solutions.  Seventeen items loaded 
unambiguously on the first factor.  35 items loaded on the second factor.  The two 
factors accounted for 65% of the sample variance.  The internal consistency of these 
two factors ranged from .93 to .88.  As expected, items included in the knowledge of 
cognition category (declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge) loaded on 
the first factor and items included in the regulation of cognition category (planning, 
information management strategies, monitoring, debugging strategies, evaluation) 




solutions (r = .54 and .45, respectively).  This finding is consistent with previous 
theoretical accounts of metacognition (Baker et al., 1984; Brown, 1987).  Although 
the magnitude of these correlations indicates that knowledge and regulation of 
cognition are related, the authors found little evidence that they share a compensatory 
relationship.   
Schraw and Dennison (1994) tested the relationship between pre-test 
performance judgments and the MAI by partitioning three groups based on pre-test 
judgments.  Pre- test judgments were used as a measure of metacognitive knowledge 
of monitoring skills.  The authors predicted that judgments of high monitoring 
accuracy would be associated with higher scores on the MAI’s knowledge of 
cognition factor.  A MANOVA using knowledge of and regulation of cognition 
scores as dependent variables did not reach significance.  However, severalone w y 
analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) revealed that knowledge of cognition scores diff red 
significantly across the three groups, whereas regulation of cognition did not.  A 
comparison of individual means using Tukey’s HSD procedure revealed that the 
highest performing group in terms of accuracy of pre-test judgments (Group 3) 
reported significantly higher knowledge of cognition scores than either Group 2 or 
group 1. 
Hammann and Stevens (1998) investigated the usefulness of the MAI in 
assessing metacognition and self regulation among 90 introductory educational 
psychology students.  Knowledge of Cognition was found to correlate positively with 
several scales of the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ, 




performance (.502), metacognitive self regulation (.393), and negatively with test 
anxiety (-.408).  Regulation of Cognition correlated positively with all four of the 
cognitive and metacognitive strategies as well as metacognitive self-r gulation (.72).   
Sperling, Howard, Saley and Dubois (2004) found that regulation of cognition 
was significantly associated with control of learning beliefs and self-efficacy for 
learning and performance, while Knowledge of Cognition had no association with 
these motivational variables.  These studies suggest that knowledge of cognition and 
Regulation of Cognition as measured by the MAI relate positively to undergraduate 
educational psychology student’s self regulation and classroom performance 
measures. 
Metacognition, Counseling, and Psychotherapy 
Theoretical and empirical literature exists to support the importance of 
metacognitive strategies to skilled counseling and therapy.  Williams, Judge, Hill, and 
Hoffman’s (1997) qualitative study of therapist’s information management strategies 
found that novice therapists used three primary strategies: focusing on the client, the 
use of self-awareness to gain a better understanding of the client, and suppres ing 
their own feelings and reactions.  Morrow and Deidan (1992) encouraged counselors 
to engage in metacognition by asking themselves a series of confirming and 
disconfirming questions about working hypotheses while remaining open to data that 
contradicts working hypotheses.  Furthermore, Ridley (1995) urged counselors to 
evaluate the effectiveness of interventions regarding their helpfulness.   
Byers-Winston and Fouad (2006) encouraged the importance of 




counselors. Their metacognitive model of multiculturally career counseling advocates 
for the development of cognitive awareness of their cultural context and how their 
own thinking and perceptions influence the way client’s cultural context is viewed.  
In their model, planning involves developing a plan of action or an awareness of what 
his or her initial goals are for working with the client.  Monitoring involves accurate 
identification of the impact of the therapist and client’s cultural values and their 
impact on goal setting.  Monitoring involves awareness to specific aspect(s) of client 
information therapists are attending and what that reflects about the therapists own 
cultural values and worldviews.  
Fauth, et al. (2007) proclaimed metacognitive strategies as the future in 
psychotherapy training.  These authors suggest that psychotherapy training focus on 
targeting therapists’ metacognitive skills of pattern recognition and mindfulness via 
experiential practice.  These authors suggested that pattern recognition tra ning of 
“important, yet just notable differences in client’s in-session behavior” (p. 386) can 
guide explicit therapeutic attention to these areas.  Training in metacognitive 
mindfulness may also assist trainees in observing their own as well as client’s 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors without judgment.  As a result, metacognitive 
mindfulness might enhance therapists’ skills around non-judgmental listening and 
accurate empathy.  Despite these theoretical suppositions little is known about 
metacognitive differences among therapists of varying levels of experienc . 
Models of Counselor and Therapist Expertise Development 
Most counseling and therapy expertise models assume that shifts in cognition, 




developmental process toward therapist expertise.  The present section examines 
three models of counselor and therapist development with the purpose of highlighting 
the role of cognitive development and self-reflection in therapist professional 
development.  These models include Loganbill, Hardy, and Delworth’s (1982) 
conceptual model, Stoltenberg’s (1998) Integrative Developmental Model and 
Skovholt and Ronnestad (1992) phase model of professional development.  
Loganbill, Hardy, and Delworth (1982) addressed the importance of cognitive 
development in their model of therapist development.  The stages include (a) a 
stagnation period; when the trainee is relatively stable but not growing, (b) a period of 
confusion; when the trainee has become aware of an issue but has not resolved it, and 
(c) a period of integration, when the trainee has developed a new way of addressing 
the issue.  Of the eight critical issues in training (e.g., competence, emotional 
awareness, autonomy, identity, respect for individual differences, purpose and 
direction, personal motivation, and professional ethics); two relate to the cognitive 
domain of professional development:  purpose and direction, and respect for 
individual differences.  According to Loganbill et al. issues of purpose and direction 
involve development of a cognitive map of how counseling can meet a wide array of 
clients’ goals.  Cognitive development also relates to the issue of respect for 
individual difference, for example, recognizing and integrating qualities of an 
individual that are strengths and those that are weaknesses.   
The Integrated Developmental Model (IDM, Stoltenberg et al., 1998) 
characterizes therapist developmental changes on three overriding structures: (a) s lf-




motivated, dependent upon the supervisor, and have limited self-other awareness.  
Self-other awareness relies upon metacognitive aspects of the self.  At Level 2, the 
trainee motivation fluctuates, and he or she experiences conflicts with dependency 
and autonomy, and focuses more on the client.  At Level 3, trainee’s motivation is 
stable; there is a firm belief in one’s own autonomy, and knowledge and acceptance 
of one’s own therapeutic strengths and weaknesses. 
Skovholt and Ronnestad’s (1992) stage model of therapist expertise 
development is based on a cross sectional qualitative study of a 100 therapists and 
counselors ranging from first year graduate students to seasoned profssionals with 
40 years of experience beyond graduate school.  Skovholt and Ronnestad’s study 
includes six general phases of therapist professional development:  (a) Lay Helper, 
(b) Beginning Student, (c) Advanced Student, (d) Novice Professional, (e) 
Experienced Professional, and (f) Senior Professional.   
 During the “Lay-Helper” phase of development, common sense and 
experiential learning are predominant forms of learning.  As individuals progress 
through the course of the lay helper phase, they begin to utilize cognitive processing 
to learn conceptual ideas and techniques.  Information is assimilated from many 
sources in a general manner that is accompanied by a sense of uncertainty.  Duri g 
the “Beginning Student” phase, students depend heavily on multiple sources of 
information for learning.  At this stage, students demonstrate an increased urgency in 
learning conceptual ideas and techniques.  Skovholt and Ronnestad (1992) suggested 





The central developmental task at the “Advanced Student” phase is to 
function at a basic professional level.  During this phase, advanced students make a 
transition from “rigid use of basic conceptual ideas and techniques to a refined 
mastery of conceptual ideas and techniques.”  According to Skovholt and Ronnestad 
(1992), the advanced student is critically assessing and evaluating theoretical models 
by engaging in the process of “differentiating, accepting, or rejecting model 
components.”   
A sense of being on one’s own exemplifies the “Novice Professional” phase.  
There is a continual process of “shedding and adding” at the conceptual and 
behavioral level (Skovholt & Ronnestad, 1992).  A central developmental task for 
most experienced professionals is to create an identity, which is highly congruent 
with their self-perceptions (values, interests, and attitudes).  Theoretical based 
concepts serve an important yet secondary function in the sense that they are accept d 
or rejected depending on the degree to which they assist meaningful interpretaion of 
clinical experiences.   
During the final “Senior Professional” phase; the therapist now demonstrates 
continual self-reflection, personal rejection of some earlier mastered conceptual ideas, 
and modification of their externally imposed professional style.  Toward the middle 
and end of this continuum, personally chosen and individualized conceptual ideas and 
techniques contribute to increased authenticity within competent professional 
boundaries (Skovholt & Ronnestad, 1992).  
Particularly relevant to the purposes of the present study are themes three and 




continual self-reflection “constitutes the central developmental processes,” but, 
experiential learning is the primary developmental process for lay helpers.  Theme 
four suggests that beginning practitioners depend on “external expertise,” whereas 
senior practitioners rely on “internal expertise.”  Similar to illness scripts described in 
the medical education literature, internal expertise results from many years of 
accumulated clinical experience and as a result may be much more idiosyncratic 
relative to external expertise.   
The counseling and therapy training literature convey a similar preferenc  in 
the advanced trainee for an internal focus.  O’Byrne and Goodyear (1997) clarified 
the important effect that reflection had in the development of therapist expertise.  
O’Byrne and Goodyear determined that as trainees applied theoretical information to 
each unique client in the context of the therapeutic process; they developed the ability 
to apply useful parts of what they had learned, and developed a deeper understanding 
of what was effective and what was not.  Ultimately O’Byrne and Goodyear found 
that as trainees looked more closely and reflected on the unique features of the clien , 
they ‘‘learn, unlearn and relearn how to see the counseling process and their role in it 
(p. 328).”  With an improved ability to maintain an internal focus, the advanced 
student is able to reflect meaningfully upon his or her own performance.   
Developmental models of therapist expertise provide a framework from which 
to study and interpret the cognitive, motivational, and metacognitive aspects of 
therapist expertise.  Specifically, to facilitate expertise, therapist tra nees must 
develop a highly structured and integrated organization of domain specific 




practice.   
Summary 
The novice-expert paradigm of the cognitive sciences has been rewarding to 
those interested in studying therapist expertise.  Cognitive psychology research 
suggests that differences in the way knowledge is organized account for more 
efficient and accurate problem solving by experts (Glaser, 1984; Gobbo & Chi, 
1986).  Similarly, the majority of therapist expertise studies find that relativ  experts 
are superior to sub experts in their efficiency and accuracy of problem solutions.  
Despite the noted advantages of expertise, problem structure seems to attenuate 
performance for those with more experience.  Characteristics of ill-structured 
problems often require experts to use additional time to create a meaningful problem 
representation.  Ill-structured problems also impact the amount of information 
expert’s process during the problem representation phase of problem solving.  
Because relative experts tend to have a greater number of domain specific knowledge 
structures, ill structured problems often result in experts comparing a greater number 
of existing cognitive structures (of problem types and solutions) for their potntial to 
meet the demands of the current problem.  The attenuating impact of ill structured 
problems on therapist expertise has been observed by (Martin et al., 1989).  
Furthermore, Hill and O’Grady (1985) found that therapists with approximately 10 
years of post internship experience have been found to organize therapist intentions 
around two broad dimensions (support/assessment versus change and therapy work 




Metacognitive processes of metacognition and self-reflection may also v ry as 
a function of experience.  Although metacognition is deemed important for 
individuals at all developmental levels; current thinking implies that knowledge of 
cognition is age dependent, more stable and more statable, whereas regulation of 
cognition is independent of age less stable and often unstatable.  That self-reflection 
is fundamental to achieve higher stages of therapist expertise Skovholt and 
Ronnestad’s (2003) suggests advanced students might especially rely upon self-
reflection as they are actively involved in structured training. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The first research question addresses the following.  If given a sorting task 
consisting of 19 therapist intentions, will senior professional therapists, advanced 
students, and lay helpers differ significantly on the following structural knowledge 
indicators:  (a) card sort score, (b) time to complete the card sort and (c) the number 
of categories produced?    
According to Skovholt and Ronnestad (1992), advanced students have 
developed “a refined mastery of conceptual ideas and techniques.”  In contrast, 
structural knowledge of senior professional therapists, like encapsulated knowledge 
of expert physicians is due largely to decades of experience and as a result is often 
times highly idiosyncratic (Remy, et al., 2002).  It is also assumed that lay helpers 
have yet to garner the requisite years of experience to develop well organized 
knowledge structures of therapy.  Based on the aforementioned assumptions, the 





Hypothesis 1a:  Advanced student’s card sort scores will be significantly  
higher than card sort scores of senior professional therapists who will have  
higher card sort scores than lay helpers. 
Relative to the amount of time taken to complete the card sort, individuals 
with more experience tend to be more efficient than those with less experience in 
solving familiar problems in a given domain.  An exception to this rule can be seen 
when individuals with more experience are confronted with less familiar or ll-
structured problems.  Under ill-structured conditions, those with more experience 
have been found to be comparatively less efficient (Chi & Glaser, 1985; Gagne, 
Gagne, Yekovitch, 1993) when solving tasks.  The card sort task in this study more 
closely resembles an unfamiliar or ill-structured task.  Given these findings and the 
ill-structured nature of the card sort, the following hypothesis will be test d. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Senior professional therapists will require significantly more  
time to complete the card sorting task than both advanced students and  
lay helpers. 
Regarding the number of categories used to sort therapist intentions; 
individuals with more experience have developed numerous and elaborate cognitive 
schemas or scripts of potential problem types and solutions (Schmidt et al., 1993; 
Schmidt, et al., 1990).  It is assumed that when faced with a relatively ill-structured 
problem; individuals with more experience scrutinize a larger number of cognitive 
structures, in turn, contributing to a greater number of categories.  Based on these 
assumptions, the following hypothesis will be tested. 




significantly greater number of categories than sorts of advanced students  
who will yield a significantly greater number of categories than lay helpers. 
The second research question addresses the following question.  When asked 
to provide ratings of metacognition and self-reflection; will significant differences be 
found in senior professional therapists, advanced students, and lay helpers self 
reported knowledge of cognition, regulation of cognition, and self-reflection?   
The available literature (Flavell, 1985 cited in Garner & Alexander, 1989; 
Kreutzer, et al., 1975) suggests that knowledge of cognition develops incrementally 
as a function of time, is task and situation independent, statable, yet sensitive to 
erroneous self reports.  As a result, individuals with more experience are likely to 
have developed a wealth of knowledge about themselves as a therapist.  Given these 
considerations, the following hypothesis will be tested. 
Hypothesis 2a: Senior professional therapists will report significantly higher  
knowledge of cognition than advanced students who will report significantly  
greater knowledge of cognition than lay helpers. 
The available literature (Flavell, 1985 cited in Garner & Alexander, 1989; 
Kreutzer, et al., 1975) suggests that regulation of cognition is age independent, task 
and situation dependent, and often times unstatable.  By extension, individuals with 
more experience may not inherently report greater regulation of cognition. 
Furthermore, empirical research (Baker, 1987; Hammann & Stevens, 1989) 
consistently fails to find significant differences in regulation of cognitio  for 
individuals of varying experience levels.  Given these considerations, the following 




Hypothesis 2b: No significant developmental differences will exist for self 
reported regulation of cognition. 
Skovholt and Ronnestad (1992) put forth the idea that self-reflection is an 
important variable that drives individuals professional development.  According to 
these authors, lay-helpers predominantly rely in experiential forms of learning.  In 
contrast, the advanced student is able to demonstrate an improved ability to maintain 
an internal focus and engage meaningfully in self-reflection (Skovholt & Ronnestad, 
1992).   
Hypothesis 2c: Advanced students will report significantly greater self-
reflection than lay helpers and senior professional therapists.   
The third research question assesses what linear combination of structural 
knowledge indicators (card sort score, time to complete card sort, and number of 
categories) and metacognitive variables (knowledge of cognition, regulation of 
cognition, and self-reflection) discriminate participants along the expertise continuum 
of lay helper, advanced student, and senior professional?  No specific hypotheses 




Chapter 3: Method 
The present chapter details the design of the present study and consists of the 
following five elements:  (a) a description of procedures for participant recruitment 
and data collection, (b) a description of the participants, (c) details of the instrumen s 
and measures used to collect structural knowledge and metacognition data, and (d) 
data analysis procedures.   
Participant Recruitment 
Participant recruitment involved two separate time periods:  lay helpers were 
recruited during the first period, advanced students, and senior professional therapis s 
were recruited during the second period.  Recruitment of lay helpers was conducted 
from December 8th to December 15th, 2008.  Recruitment of advanced students and 
experienced professionals was conducted from February 4th to July 19th, 2009.  All 
potential participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to investigate 
the nature of therapist expertise.   
To recruit lay helpers, the author visited four undergraduate sections of 
Psychology 433:  Basic Helping Skills:  Research and Practice courses and two 
undergraduate sections of EDCP 310:  Peer Counseling:  Theory and Skills at the 
student investigator’s resident university.  The recruiting visits briefly described the 
purpose of the study and secured email addresses of interested participants.  
Subsequent to the initial recruitment; potential participants received an email 
providing written information on the purpose, significance, and online nature of the 




20 minutes).  The email encouraged interested individuals to “click” the electronic 
link to the study.   
Recruitment of advanced students occurred in two phases.  First; the student 
investigator sent an email to program directors of seven Counseling Psychology 
graduate programs with which the author had personal contacts (e.g., exchanged 
contact information at professional conferences), asking them to forward the email to 
all doctoral students enrolled in their respective program.  The email described the 
purpose and online nature of the study, specified interest in students enrolled in the 
3rd year or beyond of their doctoral program, and directed interested individuals who 
met criteria to “click” on the electronic link to the study.   
A second means of recruiting advanced students was to email doctoral level 
interns at sites where the student investigator had a personal contact (e.g., a colleague 
of the student investigator on internship) asking them to forward the email described 
above to their fellow interns.  The Immaculata University pre-doctoral internship 
consortium served as an additional source of pre-doctoral level interns.   
To increase the sample size of the advanced student group the student 
investigator sent two-week and one-month reminders to faculty and training directors 
of Counseling Psychology graduate programs asking them to forward the reminder 
emails to students in their respective programs.  Two-week reminder emailswere ent 
by the student investigator to participants whose email addresses were known.   
The American Board of Professional Psychology (ABPP) member directory 
was used to recruit experienced professional therapists.  The ABPP directory was 




participants.  The student investigator sent a letter of request to participate in the 
study printed on Counseling and Personnel Services Department departmental 
letterhead and signed by both the student investigator and dissertation advisor.  The 
participation request letter described the purpose and online nature of the study, 
highlighted the importance of their designation as experts, and informed them of an 
email they would receive containing an electronic link to the survey.  Two-week, on -
month, and two-month follow-up emails were sent to prospective ABPP participants.  
See Appendix A for details of the initial recruitment and two-week follow up letters. 
Data Collection Procedures 
The choice of internet data collection methods was made given the many 
advantages of internet based research; including, the ease of obtaining large and 
nationwide samples, lower costs, security features, design options, ease of 
administration, and the finding that results tend to be equivalent to paper-and-pencil 
survey methods (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & Srivastava, 2004).  One common 
limitation of internet research includes problems in obtaining accurate respons rate , 
as unknown numbers of individuals could potentially receive emails that link them to 
the study (Gosling et al., 2004).  Another limitation of online research is the difficulty 
in guaranteeing confidentiality.  In electronic submissions, there is always a small 
chance that a third party could intercept information (Gosling et al., 2004).  In the 
current study, informed consent included the acknowledgment that confidentiality 
could not be completely guaranteed if participants choose to complete the survey.   
Psychdata.com was the host of the questionnaire instruments.  After 




introductory and eligibility requirements web page (Appendix B) asking them to 
indicate whether they met any of the three participation or screening criteria.  
Screening criteria required participants to indicate membership in one of the 
following groups:  (a) advanced undergraduate student enrolled in either Psycholog  
433 or EDCP 310 skills, (b) 3rd year or advanced doctoral student enrolled in either 
counseling or clinical psychology Ph.D. program or a clinical psychology Psy.D 
program or (c) an ABPP member. 
After participants checked a box indicating “yes” to meeting one of the 
participation criteria, they were directed to the Informed Consent page (See App ndix 
C).  Participants directed to the informed consent page received instructions to (a) 
read the informed consent information, (b) provide their electronic signature by 
typing in their name, and (c) “clicking” on a box indicating whether or not they agree 
to participate in the study.  Indicating their agreement to participate in thestudy 
directed participants to the survey questionnaires.  Indicating non-agreement to 
participate in the study exited non-participants from the survey.  
All participants who indicated agreement to participate in the study were first 
administered (a) the demographic questionnaire, (b) the 52 item MAI-TV, and (c) the 
SRIS.  Upon completion of the survey portion of the study, participants were 
informed that the study was also designed to study therapist’s knowledge of therapy 
concepts.  Participants were then asked to click on a URL link that sent them to the 
websort.net webpage.  Immediately after participants accessed the card sort, 
participants were presented with instructions on how to conduct the card sort.  





Before beginning the item sort, you will be asked to provide an email address.  Plea e
provide the email address used to contact you for this study. 
 
On the left side of the following page, you will be presented with a list of therapy 
related items.  The task is to sort the items into categories by dragging them from the 
left side panel to the sorting area of the page.  While sorting, make sure to think about 
how the items relate to each other.  When you have finished the sort please label the 
categories that you sorted the cards into by clicking the indicated category area.  You 
can label the categories any way you like, including “don’t know (DK),” “not sure
(NS)” and “not applicable (NA)."  Remember, there is no right or wrong number of 
categories. 
 
After completion of the card-sort, participants were prompted to save their 
sort and thanked for participating in the study.  
Participants 
 
Participants were undergraduate psychology and education majors at a public 
Mid-Atlantic university, counseling and clinical psychology doctoral students, and 
licensed psychologists.  At the time of data collection, the undergraduate psycholog  
students were enrolled in Psychology 433, an undergraduate basic helping skills 
course located in the Department of Psychology.  The undergraduate education 
students were enrolled in EDCP 310, a basic helping skills course in the Department 
of Education.  Doctoral students ranged from 3rd year doctoral students to 7th year 
doctoral students enrolled in APA accredited Counseling and Clinical Psychology 
programs in the United States.  Licensed psychologists were ABPP members.  The 
ABPP board certification process includes credentials review, peer-revi wed practice 
samples, and an oral examination conducted by existing ABPP certified 
psychologists.   
An a priori statistical power analysis (Cohen, 1988) determined the desirabl  




an estimated population effect size of .25.  Power analysis indicated that 125 
participants were required to attain power of .80. 
Instruments and Measures 
The therapist intentions list (Hill & O’Grady, 1985) was used in an online 
card sort task (CST), hosted and administered on websort.net.  The therapist 
intentions list consists of 19 minimally overlapping items with neutral language that 
represent general aims and goals common to all major forms of therapeutic treatment.  
See Appendix E for the list of therapist intentions. The CST measured various 
indicators of structural knowledge.  Structural knowledge indicators were (a) card sort 
score, (b) time to complete the card sort, and (c) the number of card sort categories.  
Hill and O’Grady provide adequate face and predictive validity of the 19 therapist 
intentions. 
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory-Therapy Version (MAI-TV) is a 52-
item adaptation of the MAI, (Schraw & Dennison, 1994) developed for the present 
study to assess metacognition in the domain of counseling and therapy.  The student
investigator revised items of the original domain general MAI to assess participan ’s 
current perceptions of their self-knowledge as a therapist (knowledge of cognition) 
and their ability to demonstrate specific regulatory acts (regulation of cognition) 
rather than their intention or future plans to engage in these regulatory acts.  
According to these guidelines, the current study defines therapist metacognitive 
awareness as participants’ perceived self-knowledge as a therapist and their ability to 
demonstrate a set of knowledge regulating strategies before, during and after 




As can be seen, the MAI-TV maintained the two-dimensional nature of the 
original MAI.  Furthermore, the student investigator relied upon the counselor and 
therapist development literature to inform item revisions.  The following two tenets 
guided item content revisions.  First, reflecting about one’s practical experinc s is 
critical to therapist learning and expertise.  For example, Ward and House (1998) 
describe reflective learning applied to counselor development as management of 
concentration, comprehension, and affect.  Secondly, empirical findings of Neufeldt, 
et al. (1996) identified therapist’s locus of self-attention as their own “thoughts, 
actions and emotions (p. 24). 
Item development involved 65 total revisions of the original 52 MAI items.  
These 65 revisions involved 34 revisions and 31 additions.  Revisions of the original 
MAI were made to several words:  “learning,” “task,”  “test,” “topic,” “problem,” 
“study,” “material,” “intellectual,” and “solving a problem.”  Several different 
revisions were made for references to “learning,” including, “during sessions,” 
“work,” “therapy,” “deliver therapy strategies,” and “managing client information.”  
The word “task” was converted to “session” on three separate items.  The word “test” 
was converted to “session” on one occasion.  The word “topic” was converted to 
“presenting problem” on one occasion.  Four of the additions were “a session(s),” 
eight were “client,” six additions were “therapy/therapeutic,” six were “about my 
client,” one was “myself,” two were “session notes or tapes,” one was "among things
my client say,” one was "among things my client brings up,” one was “about my 
client disclosures,” one was “mental.”  Appendix F provides the list of item-by-item 




The MAI-TV measures two components of metacognition: (a) knowledge of 
cognition and (b) regulation of cognition.  Sample knowledge of cognition items 
include: (1) “I understand my therapy strengths and weaknesses,” (2) “I have a 
specific purpose for each therapy strategy I use” and (3) “I use different therapy 
strategies depending on the situation.”  Sample regulation of cognition items include: 
(1) “I think about what I really need to learn about my client before I begin a 
session,” (2) “I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension of my 
clients,” (3) “I reevaluate my assumptions about my clients when I get confused,” (4) 
“I consciously focus my attention on important client information,” (5) “I summarize 
what I learned after I finish a session,” (6) “I create my own examples to make client 
information more meaningful.”  The MAI-TV instructions directed participants to use 
a 5-point likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree) to respond to 
items based on their current confidence levels of demonstrating various metacognitive 
acts before, during and after therapy sessions.  Participants recorded their responses 
by circling the number that best corresponds to how true or false the statement is 
about them.  
The self-reflection and insight scale (SRIS, Grant, Franklin & Langford, 
2002) is a measure of private self consciousness developed to assess “sociocognitive 
and metacognitive processes central to purposeful individual change” (p. 833).  The 
measure assesses the processes of self-reflection (SRIS-SR) and insight (SRIS-IN) 
following a program of systemized change, such as occurs in the coaching process or 
in a clinical training (Grant et al., 2002).  Only self-reflection sub-scale d ta is used 




of self-reflection consisting of the following subscales: (a) Need for Self-Reflection 
and (b) Engagement in Self-Reflection.  A sample Need for Self-reflection sub-scale 
item is “I am very interested in examining what I think about.”  A sample 
Engagement in self-reflection sub-scale item is “I often think about the way I think 
about things.”  In their development and validation study, Grant et al. (2002) reported 
a high internal consistency scale score, with coefficient alpha values of .91 fr the 
self-reflection scale.  Test-re-test reliability over 7 weeks for the self-reflection scale 
was .77 (p < .001).  The SRIS-SR scale instructions directed participants to use a 5-
point likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree) to respond to items 
based on their state of mind after therapy sessions.    
The Theoretical Orientation Profile Scale-Revised (TOPS-R, Worthington, 
Dillon, 2003) was developed from an unpublished version of the 10-item Theoretical 
Orientation Profile Scale (TOPS, Worthington & Dillon, 2000).  The TOPS-R is an 
18-item scale containing three items for each of six theoretical orientations:  
psychoanalytic/psychodynamic, humanistic/existential, cognitive-behavioral, family 
systems, multicultural, and feminist.  Three items assess adherence to eachof the six 
theoretical orientations.  Theoretical identification items refer to the ext nt to which 
respondents identify with each particular theoretical orientation (e.g., I identify with 
cognitive-behavioral orientation).  Conceptual orientation items refer to the exent to 
which respondents conceptualize cases from the perspective of each theoretical 
orientation (e.g., I conceptualize cases from a psychoanalytic/dynamic perspective).  
Finally, methodological orientation items refer to the extent to which respondents us 




techniques).  All theoretical orientation profile scale-revised items were rated on a 5 
point likert scale (1 = low to 5 = high).  The TOPS-R items are presented in Appendix 
H. 
Participants were asked to provide demographic information including their 
age, gender, race, type of graduate program and year in their program, approximate 
number of clinical hours, and years of clinical experience.  The demographic 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix I. 
Data Analysis 
 All statistics were calculated using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS; Release 18.0, Gradpack, 2007).  Cronbach’s alphas for the knowledge of 
cognition, regulation of cognition and self-reflection scales were calculated using a 
Pearson product moment correlation.  An independent samples t-test was also 
conducted to test for a significant difference between advanced students and senior 
professionals theoretical orientation scores. 
The following statistical procedures addressed the research questions and 
hypotheses posed in the present study.  Hypotheses 1a-1c were tested by a 3 x 3 [card 
sort score, minutes to complete card sort, and number of categories] x [lay helper,
advanced student, senior professional therapist] and examined the effect of 
experience level on structural knowledge indicators.   
Participants card sort scores reflect the degree to which each intention item 
were correctly sorted into a predetermined category based on Hill and O’Grady s 




intentions defined by Hill and O’Grady should be ideally sorted into five distinct 
categories as reflected in Table 1 below.   
Table 1  




























(6) Clarify (11) Encourage 
Self Control 





 (12) Identify & 
Intensify 
Feelings 





 (13) Promote 
Insight 
  (18) Deal with 
Therapeutic 
Relationship 
Note:  Parenthesized value is the sequential number of the card sort item. 
 
 A quantitative scoring procedure was developed to create a numeric card sort 
score for each participant who completed the card sorting task.  In most cases, 
participant’s sorts will not achieve the ideal five category solution.  There may be 
cases where a participant defines as few as 1 or as many as 19 categories.  A value of 
five points is given to each individual item within a category when the optimal 
category solution is achieved.  Analytic syntax was developed to complete the card-
sort scoring.  For example, starting with card-sort Item 1, “Set Limits,” the program 
defined a cluster and compared each subsequent item for cluster adherence.  The 




In the quantification process, point values were logically reduced as 
participants’ card sorts differed from the ideal five category solution.  For example, 
four points were assigned to correctly sorted intentions when only four categories 
were identified.  Similarly, four points were assigned to correctly sorted items when 
six categories were identified.  Table 2 provides a listing of scores assigned to 
individual items based on the numbers of clusters defined by the respondent.  It is 
important to note that a value of one point is assigned to items for cases when nine or 
more categories are designated.  Five category scores and one total card sort score 
was generated for each participant.  Thus, a maximum total card sort score value of 
95 (i.e., 19 items × 5 points) could be achieved through this procedure.  
Table 2 
Score Values for Correctly Sorted Items Based on Number of Categories 
Number of Categories Points per Item 
1 Category 1 Point 
2 Categories 2 points 
3 Categories 3 points 
4 Categories 4 points 
5 Categories 5 points 
6 Categories 4 Points 
7 Categories 3 Points 
8 Categories 2 Points 





Hypotheses 2a-2c was tested by a 3 x 3 one way MANOVA [knowledge of 
cognition, regulation of cognition, self-reflection] x [lay helpers, advanced students, 
senior professional therapists] to examine the effect of experience level on knowledge 
of cognition, regulation of cognition, and self-reflection.  Follow up ANOVA’s were 
used to analyze the variance in structural knowledge and metacognitive process 
scores across levels of experience.  Significance, effect size, and estimat  of power 
for each ANOVA are reported.  Post hoc Tukey’s t-tests were conducted on those 
variables that had significant ANOVA results.   
Discriminant analysis addressed the third research question.  Namely, what 
linear combination of accuracy of structural knowledge indicators and metacognitive 
processes (knowledge of cognition, regulation of cognition, and self-reflection) 
differentiate participants along the therapist experience continuum.   
A follow up multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) was conducted to 
assess for the existence of experience level differences in the structural organization 
of therapist intentions.  Table 3 specifies all research questions, hypotheses, variables, 












 Research Questions, Hypotheses, Variables and Analyses 
 
Research Q. 1 Are structural knowledge indicator scores significantly different  
between groups of lay student helpers, advanced students and  
senior professional therapists? 
Hypotheses Variables Analyses 
Hypothesis 1a:  Advanced student’s 
card scores will be significantly higher 
than card sort scores of senior 
professionals who will have higher card 
sort scores than lay helpers. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Senior professionals 
will require significantly more time to 
complete the card sorting task than both 
advanced students and lay helpers. 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  Senior professionals’ 
sorts will yield significantly greater 
number of categories than sorts of both 
advanced students and lay helpers. 
Structural Knowledge as 
measured by Card Sort 
Score, Number of 
Categories, Time to 
Complete Sort (Dependent 
Variable, Interval Data) 
 
Therapist Expertise Level: 
Lay helper, Advanced 
student, senior 
professional (Independent 






Research Q. 2 Are metacognition and self-reflection scores significantly different 
between groups of lay helpers, advanced students and experienced 
senior professional therapists? 
Hypotheses Variables Analysis 
Hypothesis 2a: Experienced 
professionals will report significantly 
higher knowledge of cognition than 
advanced students who will report 
significantly greater knowledge of 
cognition than lay helpers. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: No significant 
experience level differences will exist 
for self reported regulation of cognition. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: Advanced trainees and 
senior professional therapists will report 
significantly greater self-reflection than 
lay helpers.   
 
Knowledge of Cognition 
and Regulation of 
Cognition) as measured by 
the MAI-TV (Dependent 
Variable, Interval Data) 
 
Self-reflection as 
measured by the Self-
reflection and Insight 
Scale (Dependent 
Variable, Interval Data). 
 
Therapist Expertise Level: 
Lay helper, Advanced 
student, senior 
professional (Independent 









Research Q. 3 What linear combination structural knowledge indicators and  
metacognitive processes discriminate individuals along the  
therapist experience continuum of lay helper, advanced student and 
senior professional therapists?  





Structural Knowledge as measured 
by Card Sort score and Time to 
complete sort (Card Sort Score 
Predictor Level Variable) 
 
Knowledge of cognition and 
Regulation of cognition as measured 
by the MAI-TV (Predictor Variable, 
Interval Data)  
 
Self-reflection as measured by the 
Self-reflection subcale (Predictor 
Variable, Interval Level) 
 
Therapist Experience Level: Lay 
helper, Advanced student, senior 
professional (Independent Variable, 





A follow up multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) was conducted to 
assess for the existence of experience level differences in the structural organization 
of therapist intentions.  MDS refers to a group of descriptive procedures that 
transform data into mapped elements in one or more spatial dimensions (Kruskal & 
Wish, 1978).  For this reason, MDS analysis was conducted to uncover the spatial 
dimensions of therapist structural knowledge of the therapeutic process.  Typical data 
for MDS are numbers that indicate object similarity or proximity.  The term object 
refers to any collection of "things of interest to the researcher, such as people, items, 




numerical measure of similarity or dissimilarity, including correlations, similarity 
judgments, and co-occurrence frequencies from free sorts (Fitzgerald and Hubert,
1987).   
The primary objective of MDS is identification of the best fitting solution with 
the smallest number of dimensions.  At least three factors should be considered in 
choosing the number of dimensions in a given MDS analysis.  The first consideration 
is the number of objects, the second, is Kruskal’s stress function (1964) the squared 
correlation coefficient (R2) is the third.   
For stability considerations, a convenient empirical guideline with nonmetric 
scaling is 4k + 1 objects for a k dimensional solution (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).  The 
present study consists of 19 total objects, thus a solution consisting of no more than 4 
dimensions is likely to yield a stable solution.  Values for Kruskal’s (1964) stress 
function vary between zero and one.  The smaller the stress function, the better the 
model represents the input data.  Although no strict rule exists regarding how much 
stress is tolerable, the rule of thumb is that a value ≤ 0.1 is excellent and anything ≥ 
0.15 is not tolerable (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).  Another measure of goodness-of-fit is 
the squared correlation coefficient (R2).  The squared correlation coefficient 
quantifies the proportion of variance of the proximity data accounted for by a given n-
dimensional MDS solution (Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009).  Higher R2 
values indicate a better fit between a given proximity matrix and their corresponding 





Group differences in three-way scaling solutions are reflected by dimensional 
weights that indicate the importance, or salience, each group attached to each 
dimension.  The weirdness index indicates how unusual each subject’s weights are 
relative to the weights of the typical subject analyzed.  The weirdness index varies 
from zero to one, where a score of zero indicates that the subject’s weights are 
proportional to the average weights for n number of groups.  As the subject’s score 
becomes more extreme the index approaches one, suggesting that optimal spatial 
configuration or scaling solution fits that subject poorly.   
A nonmetric MDS analysis was conducted on all participants’ card sort data.  
A single matrix of dissimilarity was computed that represent similarity judgments of 
the 19 therapist intentions across all three experience level groups.  Values in th  
matrix represent the percentage of times each therapist intention was placed with 
every other therapist intention during the card sort.  The resulting group configuration 

















Chapter 4: Results 
 This chapter presents the results of the study using descriptive and inferental 
statistics.  Characteristics of the sample are first described.  Next, psychometric 
properties for each instrument are reported.  Finally, results of each research question 
and hypothesis is reported. 
Sample 
Three groups:  lay helpers (n = 38), advanced students (n = 39), and senior 
professional therapists (n = 28) contributed usable questionnaire data to the study.  
More than half were women (63.8%), whereas men comprised 36.2% of the sample.  
The majority of the sample was White American (82.8%); others were African 
American (4.8%), Hispanic/Latino (5.7%), Asian (6.7%), and other (1%).   
At the time of data collection, lay helpers were enrolled in one of two 
undergraduate helping skills courses: Psychology 433 (n = 14) and EDCP 310 (n = 
24).  Advanced students were enrolled in Counseling Psychology Ph.D. programs (n 
= 22), Clinical Psychology Ph.D. (n = 2), and Clinical Psychology Psy.D. programs 
(n = 10).  All 28 senior professional therapists were members of the Counseling 
Psychology division of the American Board of Professional Psychology (ABPP).  Of 
the ABPP members, 11 worked in a private practice, 8 worked in a hospital or 
medical setting, 5 worked in an outpatient community mental health setting, and 4 
worked in college counseling centers.  The sample as a whole is wide ranging in 
terms of age and years of clinical experience.  Tables 4-8 contain a summary of the 






Age and Years of Experience 
 
Continuous Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Age 105 20 80 34.43 16.97 
Years of 
Clinical Experience 
105 1 41 10.48 13.21 
 
Table 5 
Gender by Level of Experience 
 
Gender                                           Experience Level         Total    
 Lay Helper Advanced 
Student 
     Senior 
Professional 
 
Female       27       36          4     67 
Male        11         3        24     38 
Total       38       39        28   105 
 
Table 6 
Race/Ethnicity by Level of Experience 
 
Ethnicity                                       Experience Level                   Total    
                                    Lay                 Advanced            Senior  
                                  Helper               Student           Professional    
White                                             32 29   26 87 
African- 
American/Black  
3 2 0 5 
Hispanic/Latino 0 5 1 6 
Asian 3 3 1 7 





Years of Experience by Level of Experience    
                  
Experience Level N Minimum    Maximum          Mean        SD 
Lay Helper  38 1 2 1.13 .34  
Advanced Student 39 3 9 4.72 1.55  
Senior Professional 
Therapist  
28 14 41 31.18 7.32  
 
Table 8 
Age by Level of Experience  
 




           
Lay Helper 
 
20 to 24 37 97.4 
 25 to 29                                                      1 2.6 
                          
31.67 
20 to 24 8 20.5 
Advanced 
Student 
25 to 29 







                     
55.8 
30 to 59 13 46.4 
Professional 
Therapist 
60 or > 15 53.6 
Total   105    100 
 
Table 9 displays means and standard deviations of participant’s theoretical 
orientation scores.  The theoretical orientation with the highest mean score for the 
entire sample was multicultural (M = 10.50, SD = 2.88).  The existential theoretical 






Table 9  
Means and Standard Deviations of Theoretical Orientation Preference Scale Scores 
 
      Theoretical Orientation   N      Minimum   Maximum     Mean    SD 
Psychoanalytic/Dynamic  105 3 15 9.00 3.47 
Existential  105 3 15 7.80 3.03 
Cognitive Behavioral  105 3 15 9.55 3.25 
Family Systems  105 3 15 8.88 3.12 
Feminist  105 3 15 7.95 3.62 
Multicultural  105 2 15 10.50 2.88 
 
 Preliminary analysis assessed for differences in theoretical orentation scores 
between advanced students and senior professional therapists.  It was assumed that 
lay helpers have yet to develop a meaningfully informed theoretical orientation.  As a 
result, lay helpers were not included in the t-test.  Table 10 displays results of the t-
test comparing theoretical orientation scores of advanced students and senior 
professional therapists.  The advanced student group was found to have significantly 
higher multicultural and feminist theoretical orientation scores than senior 
professional therapists.  Senior professional therapists had higher existential, 
cognitive-behavioral, and family systems theoretical orientation scores.  No 









Table 10  







 M SD M SD 
Psychoanalytic/Dynamic 9.87 3.91 8.25 3.42 
Existential 7.21*  2.74 9.21*  3.52 
Cognitive Behavioral 8.74*  3.36 10.89*  3.35 
Family Systems 8.49**  2.96 10.64**  3.05 
Feminist 9.64*  3.86 7.50*  3.18 
Multicultural 11.87**  2.67 10.04**  2.62 
 
Note.  N = 105.  *p < .05., **p < .01.  
Instrument Psychometrics 
The MAI-TV consists of the knowledge of cognition and regulation of 
cognition subscales.  The Self-reflection subscale of the SRIS consists of the need for 
self-reflection and engagement in self-reflection factors.  Creators of the SRIS 
suggest combining the need for self-reflection and the engagement in self-reflection 
factors to obtain a total self-reflection subscale score.  Responses to the MAI-TV and 
the SRIS-SR were provided by all 153 participants.   
Before analyzing the data, the internal consistency of the three subscales was 
examined using Cronbach’s alpha.  These analyses indicated that all three subscales 
were internally consistent:  knowledge of cognition (.79), regulation of cognition 
(.89) and self-reflection (.93).  Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables re 




in Table 12.  Intercorrelations among theoretical orientation variables are pres nted in 
Table 13.  
Table 11 
 














Card Sort Score 105 4 70 38.90 12.90 
Number of Card Sort 
Categories 
105 2 13 4.60 1.93 
Minutes to Complete Card Sort 105 3 27 8.50 4.94 
Knowledge of Cognition 105 43 78 64.50 6.48 
Regulation of Cognition 105 62 157 126.99 14.15 




Intercorrelations between Continuous Variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Age 1        
Years of Therapy 
Experience 
.96**  1       
Card Sort Score -.25* -.27**  1      
 










    
Minutes to Complete 
Sort 
 .31  .28**  .03 .40***  1    
Knowledge of Cognition .26**  .20*  .08 .09 .11 1   
 


































         






Intercorrelations between Theoretical Orientation Scores 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Psychoanalytic/Dynamic 1      
Existential .03 1     
Cognitive Behavioral  -.29**  .04 1    
Family Systems       -.08   .28**   .27**  1   
Feminist  .29**  .18 -.17 .12 1  
Multicultural        .19   .26**   .03 -.17 .46***  1 
Note.  N = 105.  *p < .05., **p < .01., *** p < .001. 
Research Question 1 
The first research question examined whether structural knowledge scores
differed significantly across levels of experience.  A one-way multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) was conducted on the dependent variables:  (a) card sort score, 
(b) number of categories and (c) minutes to complete card sort across three levels of 
experience.  Results indicated a significant multivariate main effect for experience 
level, Wilks’s multivariate statistics = .13, F (10, 198) = 2.22, p < .01, partial eta 
squared = .14.  The effect size estimate of .14 is interpreted as a small effect siz.  
Table 14 summarizes means and standard deviations of the structural knowledge 
indicators. 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that advanced students’ card sort scores would be 
significantly higher than card sort scores for senior professional therapists whose 
scores would be significantly higher than lay helpers.  Hypothesis 1a was parti lly 
supported.  A significant univariate expertise level main effect was obtained for total 
card sort score, F (2, 104) = 5.07, p <.01, partial eta square = .09.  Examination of 




average, advanced student’s card sort scores (43.46) were higher than senior 
professional therapists card sort scores (33.82).  The second half of the hypothesis 
was not supported. Lay helpers card sort scores (37.97) were found to be higher than 
that of senior professionals; however this difference was not statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 1b predicted that senior professionals would require significantly 
more time to complete the card sort than advanced students who would require more 
time than lay helpers to complete the card sort.  Hypothesis 1b was partially 
supported.  A significant univariate experience level main effect was obtained for 
minutes to complete the card sort, F (2, 104) = 8.03, p < .01, partial eta square = .09  
Examination of pairwise experience level differences for minutes to complete the 
card sort found that lay helpers used significantly less time to complete the sort (6.13 
min.) than both advanced students (9.46 min.) and senior professional therapists 
(10.36 min.).  The mean difference in time taken to complete the card sort between 
advanced students and senior professional therapists was not statistically significant.      
Hypothesis 1c predicted that senior professional therapist’s card sorts would 
yield a significantly greater number of categories than advanced students’ card sorts 
who would yield more categories than lay helper’s card sorts.  Hypothesis 1c was 
partially supported.  A significant univariate experience level main effect was 
obtained for the number of card sort categories, F (2, 104) = 4.54, p < .05, partial eta 
square = .14.   
Examination of pairwise experience level differences for the number of cad 
sort categories found that as hypothesized, senior professional therapist’s card sorts 




The hypothesis that advanced students card sorts would yield significantly more 
categories than lay helpers was not supported (4.56 categories vs. 4.02 categories).  
Table 14 










Variables M SD M SD M SD F(2,104) η2 
Total Card 
Sort Score 
37.97b 12.20 43.46a 10.04 33.82b 15.40 5.07




6.13a 3.55 9.46b 5.84 10.36b 3.99 8.03




4.03b 1.55 4.56b 1.25 5.43a 2.78 4.54
* .14 
 
Note.  Ns for the three conditions were 38, 39, and 28, respectively.  Means with 
different subscripts in the same row differ significantly from one another (** = p < 
.01, * = p < .05 Tukey’s post hoc comparisons); those sharing the same subscript are 
not significantly different. 
 
Research Question 2 
 The second research question examined whether significant differences in 
metacognitive processes exist across levels of experience.  A one-way MANOVA 
was conducted on the following self report variables:  regulation of cognition, 
knowledge of cognition, and self-reflection.  MANOVA results revealed a significant 
multivariate main effect for experience level, Wilks’s lambda = .36, F (8, 198.00) = 
5.53, p < .01, partial eta squared = .18.  An effect size of .39 can be interpreted as a 




Hypothesis 2a predicted that senior professional therapist’s would report 
significantly greater knowledge of cognition than advanced students who would 
report significantly greater knowledge of cognition than lay helpers.  Hypothesis 2a 
was partially supported.  A significant univariate experience level main effect was 
obtained for knowledge of cognition, F (2, 104) = 5.86, p <.01, partial eta square = 
.12. Examination of pairwise experience level differences indicated that both the 
senior professional therapist group (66.39) and advanced student group (65.79) 
reported significantly higher knowledge of cognition than lay helpers (61.76).  
Contrary to what was hypothesized, significant differences were not found to exist 
between senior professional therapists and advanced students self reported knowlge 
of cognition.   
Hypothesis 2b predicted that no significant experience level differences would
exist for self reported regulation of cognition.  No significant experience level 
differences were found to exist for regulation of cognition F (2, 104) = 1.76, ns.    
Hypothesis 2c predicted that advanced students would report significantly 
greater self-reflection than lay helpers and senior professional therapists.  Hypothesis 
2c was fully supported.   A significant univariate experience level main effect was 
obtained for self-reflection, F (2, 104) = 12.07, p <.01, partial eta square = .19.  An 
effect size of .16 can be interpreted as small.  Examination of pairwise experience 
level differences found that advanced students reported significantly higher self-
























61.76a 6.91 65.79b 5.36 66.39b 6.27 5.86





125.66b 12.77 130.26b 12.46 124.25b 17.41 1.76 NA 
Self 
Reflection 
47.73b 8.34 54.64a 4.72 48.32b 6.66 12.07
***  .16 
 
Note.  Ns for the three conditions were 38, 39, and 28, respectively.  Means with 
different subscripts in the same row differ significantly from one another (** = p < 
.01; *** = p < .001, Tukey’s post hoc comparisons); those sharing the same subscript 
are not significantly different. 
 
Research Question 3 
 A forced predictive discriminant analysis (PDA) was performed on the 
following continuous variables: (a) card sort score, (b) time to complete the card sort, 
(c) knowledge of cognition, (d) regulation of cognition, and (e) self-reflection to 
assess how well these set of variables accounted for the a priori group memberships 
created in the present study.  PDA yielded two statistically significant discriminant 
functions, with a Wilks’ Lambda of .64.  The first function accounted for 58.1% of 
the variance; the second function accounted for the remaining 41.9% of the variance.  
The results indicate that card sort score, self-reflection, knowledge of cognition, and 




the three sampled groups.  Results of the discriminant function analyses are presented 
in Table 16. 
Table 16 
Discriminant Function Results using all Predictor Variables 
Discriminant 
Function 




Wilk’s Λ P 
1 .38 58.1 .53 .57 <.0001 
2 .28 41.9 .47 .78 <.0001 
 
Examination of standardized discriminant function coefficients demonstrated 
that self-reflection (.99) and card sort score (.65) had the highest loading on the first 
discriminant function.  Minutes to complete the card sort (.77) and knowledge of 
cognition (.68) had the highest loading on the second function.  Standardized and 
unstandardized coefficients for the two discriminant functions are reported in Table 
17. 
Table 17 




Discriminant Function 1 
Coefficients 
Discriminant Function 2 
Coefficients 
 Standardized Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized 
Card Sort Score  .65 .05 -.15 -.01 
Self-reflection .99 .15 -.05 <.01 
Knowledge of 
Cognition 
-.40 -.07 .68 .11 
Minutes to 
Complete Sort 
-.08 -.02 .77 .17 
Constant 
Coefficient 





The two discriminant functions correctly predicted 66.7% of all participants.  
Based on Wilk’s Lambda, the two discriminant functions predicted the correct 
classification for 60.5% of lay helpers, 69.2% of advanced students and 71.4% of 
senior professional therapists.  Table 18 presents the classification results obtained 
from the PDA analysis.   
Table 18 
Discriminant Function Classification Results 
  
                         Predicted Level of Experience 
Actual Level 
of Experience 























Note.  Values on the diagonal are hits and are in boldface type.  There are a total of 70 
hits, or 66.7%. 
   
In PDA examination of the group centroids (average discriminant scores 
assigned to each member in the group) in conjunction with the discriminant function 
structure matrix allow for a content evaluation of the two discriminant functions for 
the three experience level groups.  Group centroid and structure matrix data are 
available in Table 19.  The structure matrix depicts correlations between each 
predictor variable and the standardized discriminant functions are used to interpret 
content function (Betz, 1987).  It may be noted from the centroids that the first and 




negative centroid) from advanced students (large positive centroid).  The variables 
having the highest loadings on function one were self-reflection and total card sort 
score on which higher scores were characteristic of the advanced student group versus 
expert group.  The second function separated the lay helper group (large negative 
centroid) from the senior professional therapist group (large positive centroid).  The 
variables having the highest loading on function 2 were minutes to complete the card 
sort and knowledge of cognition on which higher scores were characteristic of the 
senior professional therapist group and lower scores characterizing the lay helper 
group. 
Table 19  


















                                                 Discriminant Function 
          Group  or Variable           1        2 
                  Group                              Group                                     
                           Centroids 
 
Lay Helpers -.23 -.66 
Advanced Students .75 .22 
Senior Professionals      -.73     .59 
Variable           Discriminant Structure Matrix 
Self-reflection  .73*  .36 
Card Sort Score .51*  -.06 
Knowledge of Cognition  .10 .64*  





MDS was used in the current study to identify salient dimensions of structural 
knowledge and to quantify the relative reliance lay helpers; advanced students and 
senior professional therapists place upon specific dimensions of therapist intentions 
relative to the exclusion of others.  Therapist structural knowledge is operatinalized 
by participants’ sorting of the 19 therapist intentions.  To determine which MDS 
solution best fit the proximity data; the student investigator followed 
recommendations offered by Kruskal and Wish, (1978) and examined indices of 
goodness-of-fit to the data of MDS solutions across 2 to 6 dimensions.  Table 20 
shows that Goodness-of-fit indices ranged from a stress value of .34 and R2 =.37 for 
the 2-dimensional solution to a 6-dimensional MDS solution with a stress value of .12 
and R2 = .71.   
Table 20 
Measures of Goodness-of-Fit for Multidimensional Scaling Analysis Solutions in 2 to 
6 Dimensions 
 
                                   Number of dimensions 
Measures 2 3 4 5 6 
Stress value .34 .25 .17 .14 .12 
R2 .37 .52 .64 .69 .71 
 
Examination of the stress and R2 values for dimensions 2-6 indicates that 
dimensions 4 through 6 have acceptable R2 values.  Stress values approach the 
suggested cutoff of < 15 at dimension 5, but with minimal improvement in R2, 
suggesting that an MDS solution with 4 dimensions fit the data most parsimoniously.  
Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of stress values for MDS solutions with 




dimension 3, which compares the MDS solutions in 3 versus 4 dimensions.  
Therefore, it was determined that the 4-dimensional solution (stress = .17, R2 = .64) 
best fits the data and would maximize the interpretability of the MDS results.   
 
 





Figure 4. Derived Stimulus Configuration of 4 Dimensional MDS Solution 
Interpretation of MDS Solution 
Therapist intentions corresponding to the most extreme stimulus coordinate 
values on the positive and negative pole of each of the four dimensions within the 
selected MDS solution were examined.  Intentions with absolute stimulus coordinate 
values greater than 1.00 were considered to make more substantive contributions to 
the interpretation of a given dimension relative to statements with absolute val es
below the cutoff value; that is, 1.00.  Interpretation of the clusters of intentions were 
made based on several factors, including the definition of the individual intentions, 




(1985) solution and the degree to which the clusters of intentions represent two 
readily interpretable ends of one continuum. 
As shown in Table 21, Dimension 1 consists of several therapist intentions 
with stimulus coordinates above the recommended absolute value cutoff of 1. For 
example, stimulus coordinate values of < 1 were found for “get information,” “give 
information,” “focus,” and “clarify.”  Intentions with stimulus coordinate values of > 
1 were “insight” and “catharsis.”  Given the similarity of the two clusters of 
intentions with clusters identified by Hill and O’Grady (1985) Dimension 1 was 
defined as “Assessment/Education versus Therapeutic Work.”   
  As shown in Dimension 2, therapist intentions with stimulus coordinate 
absolute values of <1 were “therapeutic relationship,” “set limits,” “resistance,” and 
“relieve therapists needs.”  Intentions with stimulus coordinate values > 1 were 
“change,” “reinforcing change,” “self control,” “cognitions,” and “behaviors.”  Given 
the similarity of the two clusters of intentions with clusters identified by Hill and 
O’Grady (1985) Dimension 2 was defined “Therapeutic Problems versus Therapeutic 
Change Processes.” 
As shown in Dimension 3, therapist intentions with stimulus coordinate 
absolute values of <1 were “cognitions,” “behaviors,” “resistance,” and “therapeutic 
relationship.”  Intentions with stimulus coordinate values > 1 were intentions of 
“support,” “hope,” and “focus.” Based on the definitions of the intentions and their 
unique cluster pattern, Dimension 3 was named “Challenge versus Support.”    
As seen in Dimension 4, therapist intentions with stimulus coordinate absolute 




stimulus coordinate values > 1 were intentions of “relieve therapist’s needs,” “self 
control,” “clarify,” and “set limits.” Based on the definitions of the intentions ad
existing literature (Hill & O’Grady, 1985), Dimension 4 was named “Emotional 
Insight versus Counter-Transference.” 
Table 21  
Stimulus Coordinates of the 4 Dimensional Therapist Intentions Solution  
       Stimulus Coordinates  
   Dimensions  
Therapist Intentions 1 2 3 4 
Relieve Therapist’s Needs -.02 -1.14a -.85 2.17b 
Focus -1.22a .23 1.30b -.64 
Give Information -1.52a .14 .89 .56 
Clarify -1.10a -.37 .96 -1.14a 
Self Control .57 1.16b -.22 1.40b 
Change .93 1.47b .22 .97 
Reinforce Change .15 1.67b -.30 .84 
Challenge .56 .51 -1.29a -1.01a 
Cognitions .82 1.17b -1.32a -.50 
Behavior .77 1.05b -1.45a -.48 
Support .80 .53 1.53b -.05 
Hope .96 .09 1.50b .73 
Set Limits .85 -1.47a .05 1.00b 
Get Information -1.65a -.72 .89 -.17 
Resistance .75 -1.34a -1.42a -.07 
Therapeutic Relationship .70 -1.75a -1.02a -.04 
Insight 1.21b 57 -.33 -1.30a 
Catharsis 1.79b -.37 .74 -.33 
Feelings .64 -.39 .08 -1.93a 
 
Note. Factor loadings with absolute value of > 1 are in boldface. “a” denotes negative 
stimulus coordinates with absolute value greater than 1; “b” denotes positive stimulu  
coordinates with absolute values greater than 1. 
 
In order to index the differential levels of importance placed on the four 
dimensions of the current MDS solution, the student investigator examined subject 




professional therapists) across all four dimensions.  As can be seen in Table 22 
advanced students placed most emphasis on Dimension 1, “Assessment/Education 
versus Therapeutic Work.”  Senior professional therapists placed the most emphasis 
on Dimension 2, “Therapeutic Problems versus Therapeutic Change Processes.”  
Finally, lay helpers placed the most importance on Dimension 3, “Challenge versus 
Support.”  Dimension 4, “Emotional Insight versus Counter-Transference” 
demonstrated no meaningful experience level preference.       
Table 22 
Subject Weights (Weirdness) by Dimension 
                                          Subject Weights 
Subjects                          Dimension 
Weirdness 1 2 3 4 
Lay Helpers .11 .38 .41 .48 .34 
Advanced Students .12 .53 .45 .35 .32 
Senior Professional 
Therapists 
.06 .38 .42 .35 .34 
 Overall importance  
of each dimension 
.19 .18 .16 .11 
 
Note. Subject weights representative of the dimension relied upon the most by the 















Chapter 5:  Discussion 
This chapter discusses outcomes and limitations of the findings from the 
present study.  In addition, implications for training, therapist development, and 
suggestions for future research are included.   
Differences were assessed in structural knowledge and metacognitive 
processes by level of experience.  Level of experience was found to have a significant 
impact on both structural knowledge and metacognitive variables.  Results indicated 
that advanced students had significantly higher card sort scores than both lay helpers 
and senior professional therapists.  Both senior professional therapists and advanced 
students sorted therapist intentions into a greater number of categories than lay 
helpers.  Lay helpers used significantly less time to complete the card sort than both 
advanced students and senior professionals.  Results also indicated that advanced 
students and experienced professional therapists reported higher knowledge of 
cognition scores than lay helpers.  Advanced students also reported significantly 
higher self-reflection compared to lay helpers and experienced professional therapists.  
No significant experience level differences were found for regulation of cognition. 
Results of the discriminant analysis indicate that four variables accurately 
predicted participants experience level about two-thirds of the time.  Card sort score 
and self-reported self-reflection significantly discriminated advanced students from 
senior professional therapists.  Knowledge of cognition and time to complete the card 
sort differentiated senior professional therapists from lay helpers.   
Hypothesis 1a predicted that advanced students’ card sort scores would be 




scores would be higher than lay helpers.  Results partially supported this hypothesis.  
Results demonstrated a U shaped relationship between therapist experience level and 
card sort score. Specifically, advanced students card sort scores were significantly 
higher than both lay helpers and experienced professional therapists.  These result  
suggest that advanced students compared to both lay helpers and experienced 
professional therapists structure their knowledge of therapist intentions in a ma ner 
more consistent with Hill and O’Grady’s (1985) two dimensional five factor solution.   
Advanced students superior card sort scores may result from the ill-strucutred 
nature of the card sort task.  A problem structure qualifies as ill defined if any of the 
following components are not well specified, “a clear initial state, a setof permissible 
operators, and a goal state” (Chi & Glaser, 1985, p. 246).  Problem structure is 
believed to influence individuals problem representation, and by extension, problem 
solution (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Chi & Glaser, 1985).  Problem representation 
describes the “constructed representation of a problem on the basis of individuals’ 
domain related knowledge and its organization” (Chi et al., 1981).  For example, 
medical experts have been found to rely on enabling conditions to activate 
“diagnostically salient cognitive schemas” (Koschman, Myers, Feltovich & Barrows, 
1994).  Senior professional therapists’ problem representation and resulting card sort 
score may have been influenced by the absence of contextual case information.  
Without case information or context cues, activation of senior professional therpists’ 
deep level knowledge structures might have been compromised.   
Although the problem structure of the present study had a clear initial state; 




goal state.  Differences in problem solvers representation and performance are even 
more apparent in ill-defined problems (Bedard & Chi, 1992).   In the present study, 
participants were instructed that there is no right or wrong way to sort the items.  
Instructions to sort intention into a specific number of categories would have 
increased the degree of operators and provided a better-defined goal state, thus 
enhancing the problem structure.   
Skovholt and Ronnestad’s (1992) model of therapist professional development 
might also help to explain why senior professional therapist’s structural knowledge 
scores were relatively low.  Theme four of Skovholt and Ronnestad’s model suggest 
that senior practitioners rely on “internal expertise” guided by an individually b sed 
learning method and active knowledge construction, resulting in unique and 
somewhat individualized knowledge structures.  These concepts offer support to the 
implication that in the absence of a well-defined problem structure, senior 
professional therapist card sorts may represent highly personalized rather thn widely 
accepted conceptualizations of how to conduct therapy. 
Advanced students’ superior card sort scores compared to the expert group 
might also reflect differential degrees of deliberate practice.  Ericson, (1996) 
described deliberate practice as providing “tasks with an appropriate level of 
difficulty, informative feedback and opportunities for repetition and correction of 
errors (pp. 20-21).”  Ericsson (1993) and colleagues (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; 
Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer (1993) noted that constant attention to deliberate 
practice is what separates average performance from that of truly skilled 




performers reach older ages, their performance declines result primarily from the 
reduction of regular deliberate practice, rather than as a direct consequenc  of aging.  
In contrast, advanced students are constantly engaged in supervised clinical 
experiences that offer rich opportunities for learning, practice and explicit feedback.  
Moreover, feedback can come from a great number of sources, including supervisors, 
clients, peers, instructors, and the self.   
Hypothesis 1b predicted that senior professionals would require significantly 
more time to complete the card sorting task than advanced students who would 
require more time than lay helpers.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  On 
average, senior professional therapists and advanced students used more time to 
complete the card sort than lay helpers.  These findings are consistent with expertis  
studies that consider the role of problem structure.  Bedard and Chi (1992), suggests 
that in solving ill-defined problems, more experienced individuals use considerably 
more time developing a problem representation by adding domain specific and 
general constraints or operators to the problem.  Following this line of reasoning, the 
greater number of minutes used to complete the card sort by advanced students and 
senior professional therapists might be a result of the time taken to modify the 
problem from an ill-defined problem to a better defined problem (Bedard & Chi, 
1992).   
Hypothesis 1c predicted that senior professional therapists’ card sorts would 
yield significantly greater number of categories than advanced students’ card orts 
whose would yield more categories than lay helpers card sorts.  This hypothesis was 




more categories than both advanced students and lay helpers.  These results might be 
explained by the interaction between the ill-structured nature of the card sorting task 
and cognitive schema theory.  As a result of their many years of clinical experience, 
senior professional therapists consider numerous cognitive structures during the 
problem representation phase of problem solving.  Results of the present study 
suggest that contrived or unfamiliar problems increase the number of cognitive 
schemas or structures senior professional therapists consider while solving problems.  
Existing counseling expertise research supports the aforementioned suggestion.  
Martin et al. (1989) found that compared to novices, more experienced counselors 
used more terms to conceptualize a general counseling process; however, when the 
task involved conceptualizing the counseling process with a specific client, 
experienced counselors used fewer items to conceptualize the process.   
Hypothesis 2a predicated that senior professionals would report significantly 
higher knowledge of cognition than advanced students who would report significantly 
greater knowledge of cognition than lay helpers.  Results indicated that on average, 
both the advanced student group and experienced professional group reported 
significantly higher knowledge of cognition than the lay helper group.  This pattern of 
results suggests that advanced students and experienced professionals perceive 
themselves to possess declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge superior to 
that of lay helpers.  This finding is not surprising, as lay helpers in the present study 
were undergraduate students, with little academic training and even less practical 




The absence of differences in knowledge of cognition between the advanced 
student group and experienced professional group is notable.  It could be that the 
years of experience accumulated by advanced trainees yielded substantive 
metacognitive experience to allow for meaningful growth in declarative, procedural, 
and conditional knowledge.  An alternative explanation of these findings may come 
from the Dunning-Kruger Effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), a cognitive bias in 
where the less skilled rate their own ability as much higher than it actually is.  
Furthermore, the highly skilled underrate their abilities significantly.  The Dunning-
Kruger effect is interpreted as a lack of metacognitive ability to recgnize one’s 
incompetence.  Students, particularly those in the lowest first and second quartiles of 
actual performance have been found to overestimate their mastery of material and test 
performance (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Johnson, Ehringer, & 
Kruger, 2003; Schraw & Dennison, 1994).  As such, it is plausible that advanced 
students might have overestimated their knowledge of counseling and therapy.  
Nevertheless, because of the self-report nature of the metacognition measure in the 
present study and the lack of objective performance data, whether or not advanced 
students gave accurate assessments of their knowledge of cognition cannot be proven 
or disproven.   
Hypothesis 2b predicted that no significant experience level differences would
exist for self reported regulation of cognition.  Results supported this hypothesis.  The 
pattern of regulation of cognition scores found in the present study suggests that 
therapists of all experience levels plan, monitor, and evaluate their learning and goal 




Several factors might explain why no experience level differences in 
regulation of cognition were found.  The first of these include attributes of the 
regulation of cognition construct and the second might be attributes of the three 
groups.  Difficulties in reliably reporting regulation of cognition have been noted f r 
children as well as adults (Flavell, 1985 cited in Garner & Alexander, 1989; Kreutze , 
Leonard & Flavell, 1975).  Regulation of cognition as measured in the present study 
includes factors such as monitoring, evaluation, and debugging strategies.  These 
regulatory control strategies require flexibility, and ultimately, consideration that one 
might need to reevaluate what one thinks he or she knows about a therapeutic 
situation.  One of the downfalls of experience might be increased inflexibility (Chi, 
2006; Dumont, 1991).  The potential for some degree of inflexibility among 
experienced professionals may have led to suppressed regulation of cognition self 
reports.  Lay helpers and advanced students supervised practice experiences typically 
involve explicit planning, monitoring, and evaluation processes.  As a result, these 
two participant groups may have felt confident in their endorsements of the degreeto 
which they engage in regulation of cognition.  Furthermore, the supervision of 
supervision many advanced students receive is also rich in opportunities for 
developing regulatory and control strategies.  By assisting supervisees in mon toring 
and regulatory strategies, advanced students own regulatory strategies might be 
enhanced.   
Hypothesis 2c predicted that advanced students would report significantly 
greater self-reflection than lay helpers and senior professional therapists.  On average, 




helpers and experienced professional therapists.  This finding implies that in general, 
advanced students, relative to lay helpers and senior professional therapists prioritize 
the need for engagement in self reflection and perceive that they actually engage in 
self reflection.  These results are consistent with the descriptions of the advanced 
student phase of Skovholt and Ronnestad’s (1992) phase model of counselor and 
therapist professional development.  Persons in the advanced student phase which 
underscores cognitive processes and introspection as fundamental contributors to 
advanced student’s development.  In contrast, individuals in the lay helper phase of 
development rely primarily on external models of how to conduct therapy, butthose in 
the senior professionals phase tend to rely on already constructed models of 
conducting therapy.   
The finding that advanced students reported greater self-reflection than lay 
helpers and senior professional therapists might be explained by advanced student’s 
training environment.  Advanced students’ training environment offer rich 
opportunities for self-reflection.  These include individual and group supervision, 
case conference presentations, and review of audio and video tape recordings of 
session.  In comparison, lay helpers may feel the need to engage in self-reflection, but 
have may have yet acquired the content knowledge or clinical experience necessary to 
meaningfully engage in self-reflection.  Experienced professional therapists re 
assumed to have acquired the content and clinical experience but may feel less of a 





Attributes of the SRIS might also contribute to advanced student’s higher 
reports of self-reflection.  The SRIS has been found to be associated with a self 
ruminating type of self-reflection that advanced students might be more likely to 
demonstrate relative to senior professional therapists.  If the SRIS is indeed positively 
related to an anxious type of self-reflection, senior professional therapist’s lower self-
reflection scores may be due to their increased self confidence. 
The research question exploring what linear combination of structural 
knowledge indicators and metacognitive variables discriminate participants along the 
experience continuum yielded rich findings.  Four of the six variables correctly 
discriminated participants into their actual experience level group 66.7% of the time.  
The first discriminant function discriminated the advanced students from senior 
professional therapists and consisted of the card sort score and self-reported self-
reflection.  The second discriminant function discriminated senior professionals from 
lay helpers and consisted of knowledge of cognition and time to complete the card 
sort.    
Comparison of the standardized discriminant function coefficients of self-
reflection (.99) and card sort score (.65) of the first discriminant function suggets 
that although card sort scores discriminate advanced students from senior professional 
therapists, self-reflection may better discriminate advanced students from enior 
professional therapists.  Comparison of the standardized discriminant function 
coefficients of minutes to complete card sort (.77) and knowledge of cognition (.68) 




senior professional therapists from lay helpers, minutes to complete the card sort 
might better discriminate senior professional therapists from lay helpers. 
The MDS analysis of participant’s card sort data served two main purposes.  
First MDS analysis allowed for the definition of a generic configuration of therapist 
intentions with quite readily interpretable dimensions.  The second purpose of the 
MDS was to quantify the relative reliance lay helpers, advanced students and senior 
professional therapists place upon specific dimensions of therapist intentions relative 
to the exclusion of others.  The four dimensions of functional space defined by MDS 
will be interpreted in relation to therapy process and therapist experience level; that is 
lay helper, advanced student or senior professional therapist group status.   
Stage models of therapy process (Cashdan 1973; Carkhuff, 1969 as cited in 
Hill and O’Grady, 1985) imply that in the beginning of treatment, therapists focuson 
assessment and support followed by greater efforts to promote insight and change. 
The “Assessment/Education versus Therapeutic Work” dimension describes the fir t 
dimension of participants’ structural knowledge of the therapy process and provides 
partial support for stage models of therapy process.  Specifically, therapist intentions 
of “get information,” “give information,” “focus,” and “clarify” were all clustered 
together under the Assessment/Education pole of Dimension 1.  Intentions of 
“insight,” and “catharsis” were clustered together under the Therapeutic Work pole of 
Dimension 1.   
During the assessment-education phase of therapy; therapists get information 
to help gain clarity and focus about clients’ problematic thoughts, feelings and 




making process by providing information about alternate available treatments or give 
information about one’s counseling or therapeutic style (Hill & O’Grady, 1985).  
Dimension 1 appears to contrast therapist’s initial focus on assessment and education 
with intentions related to therapeutic work of “catharsis” and “insight.”  Of the three 
participant groups, advanced students relied upon Dimension 1 the most, perhaps 
suggesting that advanced students conceptualize the therapy process somewhat 
traditionally, in a manner that prioritizes a focus on assessment, followed by initiation 
of therapeutic work intended to foster catharsis and insight. 
Therapy Problems versus Change Process was the second dimension of 
participants’ structural knowledge.  Therapist intentions of “relieve helper’s n eds,” 
“set limits,” “resistance,” and “therapeutic relationship” were all clustered together 
under the Therapy Problems pole of Dimension 2.  Intentions of “self control,” 
“change,” “reinforce change,” “cognitions,” and “behavior” were clustered together 
under the Change Process pole of Dimension 1.  Hill and O’Grady (1985) define the 
Therapy Problems cluster as involving activities that serve as obstacles to therapeutic 
work.  “Change” is thought to consist of therapist intentions to actively help the client 
learn and maintain new attitudes feelings and behaviors.  Dimension 2 also appears to 
relate to therapy process and suggests that an important aspect of the therapy process 
involves managing obstacles to a positive therapy process while promoting change 
processes of new ways of making attributions for external and internal cues, 
decreasing maladaptive behaviors and teaching new behaviors.  Of the three 




perhaps suggesting that of importance to senior professional therapists is manage ent 
of therapy problems while promoting therapeutic change processes.   
Challenge versus Support is the third dimension of participants’ structural 
knowledge.  Specifically, therapist intentions of “maladaptive behaviors,” 
“maladaptive cognitions,” “challenge,” “resistance,” and the “therapeutic 
relationship” were all clustered together under the Challenge end of Dimensions 3; 
similarly, intentions of “support,” “hope,” and “focus” were clustered together under 
the Support end of Dimension 3.  These results suggest that challenging clients’ 
resistance to changing maladaptive behaviors and cognitions while promoting hope, 
support and focus may also be of importance to the therapy process, particularly to 
lay helpers.  Of the three participant groups, lay helpers relied upon Dimension 3 the 
most.   
Emotional Insight versus Countertransference/Transference Management is 
the fourth dimension of participants’ structural knowledge.  The intentions that 
comprise the Emotional Insight pole of Dimension 4 are “feelings,” “insight,” 
“clarify,” and “challenge.”  The intentions that comprise the 
Countertransference/Transference Management pole of Dimensions 4 are “relieve 
helper’s needs,” ”self-control,” and “set limits.”  Hill and O’Grady (1985) referred to 
the co-occurrence of feelings and insight intentions as promoting “emotional insight” 
(p. 16).  Kivlighan (2008) concluded that expert counselors used the “feelings”, 
“insight”, and “clarify” intentions along with other intentions as a part of a complex 
process to further the counseling process.  In the present solution “challenge” and 




the feelings and their meaning might be a challenging yet important aspect of 
promoting emotional insight.  In contrast to promoting emotional insight, Relieving 
Therapist’s Needs by “setting limits” and promoting clients and therapist “self 
control” are of primary importance to the therapy process.   
Some overlap appears to exist between Dimension 3 and 4 that warrants 
discussion.  Although these two Dimensions share intentions of “cognitions,” 
“behaviors,” “resistance,” and “therapeutic relationship”, Dimension 3 consists of 
change oriented intentions such as “change,” “reinforce change,” and “self-control.” 
In some contrast, Dimension 4 consists of the additional therapist intention of 
“challenge.”  This may suggest that although both senior professional therapists and 
lay helpers focus on “behaviors” and “cognitions,” senior professional therapists may 
use these intentions with an explicit interest in promoting change, perhaps a purpose 
not explicitly intended by lay helpers.   
Limitations of the Study 
There are some methodological issues to consider when interpreting of the 
results of this study.  Methodological issues include the following:  (a) the potential 
for sample bias, (b) the use of an online data collection method, (c) the lack of rich 
psychometric data of the MAI-TV and (d) the failure to assess recent therapy 
experience and involvement in supervision.  
The use of a convenience sample of lay helpers is one potential source of 
sample bias that may have influenced the pattern of results.  First, lay helpers wer  
enrolled in a helping skills course in where discussion of therapist intentions might 




undergraduate courses they may have been more familiar than advanced students and 
senior professional therapists.  A second potential for sample bias relates to 
differential incentive for participation.  Although most respondents in this study 
responded willingly with no external reward, lay helpers were given an incentve i  
the form of extra credit toward their helping skills course.  It is unclear what imp ct, 
if any, the extra credit had on lay helper’s performance.  On one hand, these 
participants might have completed the questionnaire and sorting task more 
haphazardly, simply to receive the extra credit.  On the other hand, receiving extra 
credit could have led some students to work longer to prove to themselves that they 
deserved the extra credit they were to receive.  That lay helpers completed th  sorting 
task in the shortest amount of time, suggests that the former is more likely than the 
latter.   
The online data collection procedures might have had differential impact on 
the card sort data.  Although the websort.net user interface is simple and user 
friendly, it is possible that senior professional therapists might have been less 
comfortable with the online data collection procedures.  To the degree that senior 
professional therapists were less comfortable with the online data collection 
procedures, their performance on the card sort task and subsequent structural 
knowledge indicators may have been negatively affected.  For example, senior 
professional therapists were found to use more time to complete the card sort than 
both lay helpers and advanced students.  It remains unclear to what degree the 




of differing degrees of comfort with the online data collection method, or as stated 
earlier, an artifact of the ill-structured nature of the card sort used in this study.
The student investigator adapted the original metacognitive instrument for use 
in the present study.  Although the knowledge of cognition and the regulation of 
cognition subscales had high alpha coefficient values, other psychometric properties 
are unknown.  Several items of the original MAI appear to have high potential for 
socially desirable responding and thus it is likely that the MAI-TV may be quit
susceptible to desirable responding.  Moreover, metacognition has been described as 
a fuzzy concept (Flavell, 1981).  Specifically, the regulation of cognition subscale has 
been described as sometimes unstatable (Brown, 1987), as such; it may have been 
difficult for participants to reliably respond to regulation of cognition items.   
Another methodological limitation of the present study is the failure to assess 
senior professional’s recent clinical experience.  Although senior professional 
therapists possessed on average 31 years of experience, it is plausible that senior 
professional therapists may have accumulated much of their clinical experience at 
earlier points in their career.  In addition, the amount of supervision and feedback 
received by participants is unknown.  Although it might be safe to assume that 
trainees who participated in the present study were receiving feedback and 
supervision, the same cannot be confidently assumed for senior professional 
therapists. 
Lastly, it is recognized that the present study is correlational in nature.  As a 
result, the findings represent effects in the sample and methods used and are 




experienced professional therapists as a whole.  Despite these conditions, the present 
study represents an initial step in the search for the knowledge and skills that 
distinguish lay helpers, advanced student therapists and experienced professional 
therapists.  Because of these limitations, conclusions made from these results must be 
interpreted with caution.   
Implications for Therapist Expertise 
Therapist expertise can be thought of as the knowledge and skills that 
differentiate highly skilled therapy performance from less skilled therapy 
performance.  Findings of the present study suggest that the nature of therapist 
expertise may be quite complex and to some degree dependent upon the structure of 
the specific problem or task used to study expertise.  With practice, experienced 
therapists may develop unique or idiosyncratic knowledge structures of how to 
conduct therapy.  For example, the senior professional therapists in the presentstudy 
appear to conceptualize the therapy process relative to promoting change processes 
all the while managing to use the therapeutic relationship and limit setting to 
circumvent potential problems to the therapy progress.  Advanced student on the 
other hand, appear to conceptualize the therapy process in a more traditional manner 
by placing more emphasis on assessment, both early in treatment as well as during 
specific sessions.  Following initial assessment oriented work; advanced student  may 
follow up with intentions to create a safe environment for clients to discuss thoughts 
and feelings with the goal of catharsis and insight.  Lay helper’s on the other hand, 
appear to conceptualize the therapy process in a manner that challenges cients’ 




lay helpers might have yet to develop awareness of and knowledge of using the 
therapeutic relationship as a therapeutic tool.  
Although advanced students had higher card sort scores than senior 
professional therapists, whether or not advanced trainees can put their well organized 
structural knowledge to use and outperform experts in the field remain unclear.  Birk 
and Mahalik (1994) suggested that negative cognitive, affective, and motivational 
states including distraction, anxiety, and confidence might compromise field-based 
performance of therapists in training.  Advanced students may have adequate 
declarative and procedural knowledge but lack the necessary knowledge of when to 
use their knowledge.  For example, senior professional therapists might possess the 
knowledge of therapeutic conditions that would make the experience of intense affect 
in therapy more or less therapeutic. 
Although reflection is thought to be a prerequisite for optimal learning and 
professional development at all levels of experience (Ronnestad & Skovholt, 2003), 
results of the present study suggest that some senior professional therapists might 
engage in less self-reflection than advanced students.  It is also possible that th se 
senior professional therapists might engage in a different form of self-refl ction. 
Nevertheless, given the performance deficits resulting from decreasd deliberate 
practice, it may be important for senior professional therapists to continue to engage 
in self-reflection in order to manage the potential for bias that accompanies many 
several decades of clinical experience.  
One of the potential pitfalls of expertise is the increased propensity for a 




theoretical templates in problem solving, including confirmatory bias, or the tendency 
to seek validation of initial impressions.  Several counselor and therapist researchers 
(Byers-Winston & Fouad, 2006; Morrow & Deidan, 1992; Ridgley, 1995) suggested 
that metacognitive strategies of planning, monitoring, and evaluating may be 
important in protecting against bias, errors in judgment, treatment that may result 
from accumulated years of clinical experience.  
  Implications for Training and Supervision 
  
The present study found notable differences in structural knowledge and 
metacognitive processes as a function of experience level. The specific attern of 
results yields several implications for training and supervision.   
Assuming that training and supervision emphasizes structural knowledge and 
metacognitive development, it would be important to design curricula specifically 
intended to facilitate growth in these areas.  In addition, it would be helpful to 
identify techniques trainers and supervisors can use to improve trainees’ structural 
knowledge and metacognitive development.  One example of a metacognitive 
approach to therapist training is Bennet-Levy et al. (2001) Self-Practice/Self-
Reflection approach to training cognitive behavioral therapists.  These authors found 
that cognitive therapy trainees in a university clinical psychology program reported 
increased self-efficacy in directing their attention towards themselve  by helping 
them become more sensitive to their behavior, their cognitive schemata and their 
interactional styles.  Additionally, trainees felt that this kind of self-exploration 
helped them to (a) communicate the conceptual framework of cognitive therapy, (b) 




collaboratively, and (d) appropriately self-disclose.  Participants also showed 
improvement in checking their assumptions about client’s readiness for change.   
One of the building blocks of expertise is pattern recognition or the ability to 
discern and respond effectively to the most important events and experiences within a
given psychotherapy session.  Fauth et al. (2007) encouraged training therapists in 
metacognitive skills of pattern recognition and mindfulness.  Fauth et al. suggest that 
these patterns represent potentially useful therapeutic foci that “once 
recognized….can guide explicit therapeutic attention to these areas” (p. 385).  
Writings of early developmental theorists and cognitive scientists offer several 
avenues from which therapist structural knowledge and metacognitive processes 
might be enhanced.  Peer interactions and self explanations (Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu & 
Lavanchar, 1994) are believed to positively impact structural knowledge and 
metacognitive development.  Self-explanation is the process of clarifying and making 
more complete to oneself the content of an exercise.  Several studies in cognitive 
science point that students who spontaneously self-explain when they study learn 
more (Chi et al., 1989).  Moreover, self-explanations are usually more effective than 
explanations provided by others, because they require students to elaborate their 
existing knowledge.  However, studies show that most students do not spontaneously 
engage in self-explanation and often need guidance to do it (Bielaczyc, Pirolli, & 
Brown, 1994) or need just to be prompted to do it (Chi et al., 1989).  Interpersonal 
process recall procedures (Carkhuf, 1969) might provide the type of opportunities for 
self explanation discussed by Chi and colleagues.  In addition, supervisors can help 




a-loud” method of the cognitive sciences to demonstrate the use of metacognitive 
strategies.  The post session discourse between supervisor and trainee that occurs 
during live supervision might be a medium from which trainees’ structural knowledge 
and metacognitive processes might be enhanced. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Although informative, the research findings of the present study leave many 
questions.  Future therapist expertise research should address the impact of structural 
knowledge and metacognitive processes on counseling and psychotherapy training 
outcomes.  For example, a longitudinal study with a representative sample would 
provide the necessary data to more comprehensively test the assumptions of Skovholt 
and Ronnestad’s (1992) phase model of counselor and therapist professional 
development.  These authors suggest that changes occur in anxiety and confidence as 
therapist’s progress along the experience continuum.  Exploring the impact of these 
changes in relation to therapist expertise development is needed to more fully 
understand the nature and course of therapist expertise and its development.   
Ultimately, therapist expertise is performance based, thus another direction for 
future research would be studying how laboratory measures of structural knowledge 
and metacognition relate to field based practices including, assessment, diag osis, 
treatment planning, therapist performance and client outcome.  
Although outcome studies do not support the differential effectiveness of 
different theories (Smith, Glass, & Miller 1980; Stiles, Shapiro & Elliot, 1986), 
Worthington and Dillon (2003) observed that there is “substantial evidence that 




epistemic beliefs, verbal response behavior, and specific therapeutic techniques” (p. 
95).  As such, how structural representations of therapy vary by theoretical orientation 
preference would be important to explore.   
An enduring issue related to metacognition is the issue of valid and reliable 
measurement, particularly in relation to specific domains (Garner & Alexander, 1989; 
Schraw & Dennison, 1994).  Empirically developing and validating a measure of 
therapist metacognition would be invaluable in studying the role of metacognition i 
therapist expertise.  Empirical data to support the potential for metacognition to 
moderate therapist errors and biases is scant but can be tested empirically us ng 
analogue studies.   
Finally, as therapists move along the experience continuum, mental models 
are elaborated and the connection between the given conditions and choice of 
intervention may become increasingly automated (Glaser, 1989; Gott, et al., 1991).  
These assumptions suggest that metacognitive factors might be responsible for small 
shifts in structural knowledge.  The relations between metacognition, structural 
knowledge development, and expertise development are only speculative at this point 
and would contribute significantly to the therapist expertise literature. 
Conclusion 
The primary motivation for conducting this study was the premise that 
experience is not the only factor associated with therapist expertise development 
(Dawes, 1994; Martin, et al., 1989).  Instead, differences in therapists’ structural 
knowledge and metacognitive processes are expected to coincide with differences in 




differences do exist in structural knowledge and metacognitive processes.  An 
inverted U relationship was found between experience level and participant’s card 
sort scores and self reported self-reflection.  Furthermore, self-refl ction and card sort 
scores discriminate advanced students from senior professional therapists and 
knowledge of cognition and time to complete the card sort discriminated senior 
professionals from lay helpers.   
MDS results indicated that as a whole, the present sample cognitively 
organized the therapy process along four dimensions.  The first dimension includes 
intentions to assess client problems versus intentions to engage client’s in therapeutic 
work.  Dimension 1 was relied upon most heavily by advanced students.  A second 
dimension of participant’s structural knowledge of the therapeutic process con ists of 
intentions around managing therapeutic problems while promoting therapeutic change 
and was endorsed most by senior professional therapists.  The third dimension 
appears to be relied upon the most by lay helpers and consists of frequently used 
intentions regardless of one’s preferred theoretical orientations versus those that 
traditionally, are thought to be used by persons of one theoretical orientation over 
another.  Finally, dimension 4 identified intentions to promote emotional insight 
versus managing counter transference/transference reactions. 
   Results of the present study also suggest that therapist expertise might 
depend upon the type of problem or task being used to assess expertise.  Whether 
studying therapist expertise in the laboratory or in the field, it is important to consider 





Appendix A: Initial Recruitment Email 
 
Subject:  Therapist Expertise Development:  Correlates of Metacognition and 
Structural Knowledge, Dissertation Study 
 
Dear (Name) or (Therapist-in-Training at X University),   
 
My name is Kevin London, and I am a doctoral candidate in the Counseling 
Psychology program at the University of Maryland, College Park.  My dissertation 
research investigates expertise development as a function of counselor/therapis  
knowledge and metacognition. 
 
I am writing to invite you to participate in my study.  Participation would involve 
completing a brief instrument battery and a counselor/therapist intentions game, 
which can be accessed online via the URL link below (total participation time of 
approximately 10-20 minutes).  Your participation would be extremely helpful in 
generating knowledge that can hopefully contribute to more effective 
counselor/therapist training.  In addition, I hope this survey will give you an 
opportunity to reflect on important aspects of your training experiences.   
 
TO ACCESS THS STUDY, PLEASE CLICK HERE:  
 
 
Thank you for your consideration.  This research has been approved by the University 
of Maryland, College Park Institutional Review Board (IRB), Approval #.  Please 
note that by agreeing to participate in this online survey, we are assuming that you are 
over 18 years of age and have provided your informed consent.  If you have questions 
about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related injury, 
please contact: IRB Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742; 




Kevin London, M.A.         Dennis Kivlighan Jr., Ph.D.  
Doctoral Student                      Professor                                               
301-314-7692                          301-405-2863 













Appendix B: Web Survey Introductory Page and Eligibility Requirements 
 
Welcome to my Counseling Knowledge and Skills Study 
I greatly appreciate your participation in my dissertation research.  Please allow 20-30 
minutes to complete the survey and task in one sitting.  Please proceed to the next 
page to read the eligibility requirements.  **Participant clicks “Next” to proceed and 
is taken to the “Eligibility page”. 
 
Eligibility to Participate in this Study 
Eligibility to participate in this study requires you to meet ONE of the following 
criteria:  
 
1) you must be enrolled in either Psychology 433 or EDCP 310 at the University of 
Maryland  
 
2) you must be a trainee or intern in a doctoral program in one of the mental health 
professions (e.g., counseling psychology, clinical psychology)  
 
3) you must be a member of the American Board of Professional Psychology 
 
Please indicate which of these criteria you meet. 
___ Psychology 433 or EDCP 310 student  
___ Trainee or Intern 
___ American Board of Professional Psychology Member 
___ Neither of the above 
 
Clicking “PSYCHOLOGY 433/EDCP 310 STUDENT,” “TRAINEE or INTERN” or 
“AMERICAN BOARD of PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY MEMBER”  takes 
participants to the Informed Consent page see Appendix B; “Clicking”None takes 




Thank you for your consideration of my study!   
My study is about the experiences of novice therapists-in-training, advanced 
graduate level clinicians and highly skilled therapists.  Your response indicate  that 
you did not meet either of these criteria, so you are not eligible to participate at this 
time.  If you have any questions about my study, please contact either Dr. Dennis 
Kivlighan Jr., (Counseling and Personnel Services Department, University of 
Maryland, College Park, B0100H Cole Field House, College Park, MD 20742; 
phone: 301-405-2863; email: dennisk@umd.edu) or Mr. Kevin London (Counseling 
and Personnel Services Department, University of Maryland, College Park, 0104 
Shoemaker Building, College Park, MD 20742; phone: 301-314-7692; email: 
klondonumd@gmail.com). 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report 




University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742; (e-mail) 
irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-0678.  
**At the end of Demographic Questionnaire, clicking “Next” takes participants to 
the following last page of the survey: 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
I greatly appreciate the time you took to participate in my study!  Your partici tion 
will help generate knowledge about the processes used by supervisors to focus on 
their supervisees' strengths and deficits, which may one day be used to inform more 
effective supervisory practices. 
 
If you would like to be emailed a summary of the results of this research, please
provide your email in the space below.  Your email address will be kept separate from 




































Appendix C:  Informed Consent Form 
 
Please read the Informed Consent below.  After reading the Informed Consent, please 
provide your electronic signature, and then click one of the two boxes at the bottom 
of the page to indicate whether you agree to participate in this research. 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY  
 
PROJECT TITLE 
Therapist Expertise:  Correlates of Structural knowledge and Metacognition 
 
WHY IS THIS RESEARCH BEING DONE? 
This is a research project being conducted by Dr. Dennis Kivlighan Jr., and Mr. 
Kevin London at the University of Maryland, College Park.  We are inviting you to 
participate in this research project because you are a novice therapist-in-training or an 
advanced graduate trainee.  The purpose of this research project is to investigate the 
relationship between Metacognition, Structural knowledge and Expertise.  By 
examining the relationship between these two variables, perhaps we can better help 
trainees to regulate their counseling knowledge, skills and experiences in a way that 
facilitates structural knowledge development. 
 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO? 
The procedures involve completing a series of measures via an online survey, in 
which you will respond to questions about yourself as a trainee.  Questions from the 
survey will be in Likert scale format (e.g., rating on a scale where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 5 = strongly agree).  An example item is “I reevaluated my assumptions 
about my client when I became confused.”  You will also be asked to complete a 
conceptual mapping task.  Participation in this study involves completion of the entire 
survey and mapping task in one sitting in any location where you have internet 
access, will require a 20-30 minute time commitment.   
 
WHAT ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY? 
We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential.  To help protect 
your confidentiality, (1) your name will not be included on the surveys and other 
collected data; (2) a four-digit code will be placed on the survey and other collected 
data; (3) through the use of an identification key, the researcher will be able to link 
your survey to your identity; and (4) only the researcher will have access to the 
identification key.  Data will then be saved in a password-protected file on the student 
investigator's computer.  Only the student investigator will know the password, thus 
ensuring that other individuals do not have access to data.  In addition, when 
reporting the results of this study, only aggregate data will be reported.  If we write a 
report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected to the 
maximum extent possible.  Your information may be shared with representatives of 
the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or 





One limitation inherent in internet research such as this study is that confidential ty 
CANNOT be completely guaranteed; in electronic submissions, there is always a 
small chance that information could be intercepted and read by a third party.  
However, given the focused nature of participant recruitment for this study(i.e., the 
study will not be widely advertised) and the probably limited value of the data to a 
third party, it seems unlikely that this data will be a target for interception.   
 
WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF THIS RESEARCH? 
There may be some risks from participating in this research study.  You may 
experience slight discomfort when asked to reflect on your experiences in traini g or 
working as a counselor/therapist.  However, this possible discomfort may be 
beneficial, as reflecting on your training experiences is an important part of your 
professional development.   
 
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF THIS RESEARCH? 
This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help the 
investigator learn more about how counselor/therapists and trainees structure 
knowledge and skills and make meaning of their clinical experiences so that, in time, 
we can gain a better understanding of counselor/therapist expertise performance.  We 
hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through improved 
understanding of training counselor/therapist in knowledge and skills consistent with 
expertise in the domain of counseling/therapy. 
 
DO I HAVE TO BE IN THIS RESEARCH?  MAY I STOP PARTICIPATING AT 
ANY TIME? 
Your participation in this research is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part at 
all.  If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating t any 
time.  If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating  any 
time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.   
 
IS ANY MEDICAL TREATMENT AVAILABLE IF I AM INJURED? 
The University of Maryland does not provide any medical, hospitalization or other 
insurance for participants in this research study, nor will the University of Maryland 
provide any medical treatment or compensation for any injury sustained as a result of 
participation in this research study, except as required by law. 
 
WHAT IF I HAVE QUESTIONS? 
This research is being conducted by Dr. Dennis Kivlighan Jr., and Mr. Kevin London 
at the University of Maryland, College Park.  If you have any questions about the 
research study itself, please contact either Dr. Dennis Kivlighan Jr., (Counseling and 
Personnel Services Department, University of Maryland, College Park, B0100H Cole Field 
House, College Park, MD 20742; phone: 301-405-2863; email: dennisk@umd.edu) or Mr. 
Kevin London (Counseling and Personnel Services Department, University of Maryland, 
College Park, 0104 Shoemaker Building, College Park, MD 20742; phone: 301-314-7692; 
email: klondonumd@gmail.com). 
 




research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University 
of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742;  
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-0678  
 
 
STATEMENT OF AGE OF SUBJECT AND CONSENT [Please note: Parental 
consent always needed for minors.] 
 
Your electronic signature (typing in your name below) indicates that:   
you are at least 18 years of age,  
the research has been explained to you;  
your questions have been fully answered; and  
you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research project. 





Please click below to indicate whether you agree or do not agree to participate in this 
research. 
__Yes, I agree to participate 




























Appendix D:  Metacognitive Awareness Inventory-Therapist Form. 
 
9. I slow down when I encounter important things about my clients (IMS).       
Please read each item carefully and indicate the extent to which you agree (or disagree) with each of the 
statements listed below using the following scale: 
 
 = Strongly Disagree              = Disagree          = Neutral             = Agree             Strongly Agree
         
 
Regulation of Cognition   SD  D   N  A   SA 
6. I think about what I really need to learn about my client before I begin a session.  
(P) 
     
8. I set specific goals before I begin a session (P)      
22. I ask myself questions about the client before I begin a session (P)      
23. I think of several ways to approach my clients’ problem(s) and choose the best 
one (P) 
     
42. I consider supervisor, teacher, or peer recommendations before I begin a 
session (P)  
     
45. I organize my time to best accomplish session goals (P)       
1. I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my session goals.  (M)      
2. I consider several alternatives to my clients’ problem before I respond (M)      
34. I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension of my clients’ 
disclosures (M) 
     
11. I ask myself if I have considered all options when helping a client to solve a 
problem (M) 
     
21. I periodically review session notes or tapes to help me understand important 
relationships among things my clients bring up (M) 
     
28. I find myself analyzing the usefulness of therapy strategies while reviewing 
session notes or tapes (M) 
     
49. I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am working with an 
unfamiliar client (M)  
     
25. I ask others for help when I don’t understand something about my client’s (DS)      
40. I change strategies when I fail to understand something about my client’s (DS)      
44. I reevaluate my assumptions about my clients when I get confused (DS)      
51. I stop and go back over new client information that was not clear (DS)      
52. I stop and review session notes or tapes when I feel confused (DS)      
7. I know how well I did once I finish a session.  (E)      
19. I ask myself if there was a different way to do things after I finish a session (E)      
36. I ask myself how well I accomplished my goals once I’m finished a session (E)      
38. I ask myself if I have considered all options after helping my client’s solve a 
problem (E) 
     
24. I summarize what I learned after I finish a session (E)      
50. I ask myself if I accomplished as much as I could have once I finish a session  
(E) 




13.  I consciously focus my attention on important client information (IMS)       
31. I create my own examples to make client information more meaningful (IMS)      
48. I focus on the overall meaning rather than specifics of what my clients’ say 
(IMS) 
      
41.I use an organizational structure of therapy to help manage client information 
(IMS) 
      
 
 
Please read each item carefully and answer the extent to which you agree (or disagree) with each of the 
statements listed below using the following scale: 
   Strongly Disagree   SD 
   Disagree   D 
   Neutral              N 
   Agree    A  
     Strongly Agree  SA 
Knowledge of Cognition  SD D N A SA 
5. I understand my therapy strengths and weaknesses (DK)       
12. I am good at organizing client information (DK)       
17. I am good at remembering client information (DK)       
3. I try to use therapy strategies that have worked with clients’ in the past (PK)       
14. I have a specific purpose for each therapy strategy I use (PK)       
15. I work best when I know something about my client’s presenting  
problem (CK) 
      
      32. I am a good judge of how well I understand therapy (DK)       
16. I know what my supervisors or colleagues expect me to learn about myself   
(DK) 
      
      18. I use different therapy strategies depending on the situation (CK)       
      20. I have control over how well I deliver my therapy strategies (DK)        
      26. I can motivate myself to use a specific therapy strategy when I need to (CK)       
      27. I am aware of what therapy strategies I use when I do therapy (PK)       
      29. I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my therapeutic          
            weaknesses (CK) 
      
      33. I find myself using helpful therapy strategies automatically (PK)       
1. I know when each strategy I use will be most effective (CK)       
      46. I learn more about a client when I am interested in him or her (DK)       
10. I know what kind of information is most important to learn about my  
      clients. (DK) 
      
37. I create mental pictures or diagrams to help me understand during sessions 
(IMS) 
      
30 I focus on the meaning and significance of new client information (IMS)       
47. I try to break therapy down into smaller steps.  (IMS)       
43. I ask myself if what I’m hearing from my client is related to what I already 
know (IMS) 
      
39. I try to translate new client information into my own words (IMS)       






Appendix E. List of Therapist Intentions 
 
 
1. Set Limits 
2. Get Information 




7. Instill Hope 
8. Encourage Catharsis 
9. Identify Maladaptive Cognitions 
10. Identify Maladaptive Behaviors 
11. Encourage Self Control 
12. Identify and Intensify Feelings 
13. Promote Insight 
14. Promote Change 
15. Reinforce Change 
16. Deal with Resistance 
17. Challenge 
18. Deal with the Therapeutic Relationship 


























Appendix F. List of Changes Made to Convert the MAI to the MAI-TF 
1. Added “session” 
2. Replaced “a problem” with “my clients’ problem” and replaced answer with 
respond 
3. Added “therapy” and “with clients” 
4. Replaced “while learning” with “during sessions” 
5. Replaced “intellectual” with “therapy” 
6. Added “about my client” and replaced “task” with “a session” 
7. Replaced “a test” with “a session” 
8. Replaced “a task” with “a session” 
9. Added “about my client” 
10. Added “about my client” 
11. Replaced “when solving a problem” with “helping a client to solve a problem” 
12. Added “client” 
13. Added “client” 
14. Added “therapy” 
15. Replace “learn” with “work” and replace “the topic” with “my client’s 
presenting problem” 
16. Replace “teacher” with “supervisor, peers” and added “about myself” 
17. Added “client” 
18. Replaced “learning” with “therapy” 
19. Replaced “easier” with “different” and replaced “task” with “session” 
20. Replaced “learn” with “deliver my therapeutic strategies” 
21. Added “session tapes and notes” and added “among things my clients bring 
up” 
22. Replaced “material” with “case” and added “a session” 
23. Replace “solve a problem” with “approach a problem” 
24. Added “a session” 
25. Added “about my clients” 
26. Replaced “learn” with “use a specific therapy strategy” 
27. Replaced “study” with “am doing therapy” 
28. Added “therapy” and replaced “I study” with “reviewing notes or tapes” 
29. Added “therapeutic” 
30. Added “client” 
31. Added “client” 
32. Replaced “something” with “therapy” 
33. Replaced “learning” with “therapy” 
34. Added “of my clients’ disclosures” 
35. Added “therapy” 
36. Added “a session” 
37. Replaced “draw” with “create” and Added “mental” and replaced “learning” 
with “during sessions” 
38. Replaced “I solve a problem” with “helping my clients’ solve a problem” 
39. Added “client” 




41. Replaced “text” with “therapy” and replaced “learn” with “manage client 
information” 
42. Replaced “a task” with “a session” 
43. Replaced “what I’m reading” with “what I’m hearing” and added “from my 
client” 
44. Added “about my client” 
45. Replaced “my goals” with “session goals” 
46. Added “about my client” and replaced “topic” with “him/her”. 
47. Replaced “studying” with therapy 
48. Added “of what my clients say” 
49. Replaced “learning something new” with “working with an unfamiliar client” 
50. Replaced “learned as much as I could have” with “accomplished as much as I 
could have” and replaced “task” with “session” 
51. Added “client” 



































Appendix G. Self-reflection and Insight Scales 
 
Thinking about after your session, please read each item carefully and answer the 
extent to which you agree (or disagree) with each of the statements listed below 
using the following scale: 
   Strongly Disagree   SD 
   Disagree   D 
   Neutral              N 
   Agree    A  
     Strongly Agree  SA 
 
After Sessions I…………. 
 
 
Please read each item carefully and answer the extent to which you agree (or 
disagree) with each of the statements listed below using the following scale: 
   Strongly Disagree   SD 
   Disagree   D 
   Neutral              N 
   Agree    A  
     Strongly Agree  SA 
 
I am usually aware of my thoughts       
I’m often confused about the way that I really feel about things       
I usually have a very clear idea about why I’ve behaved in a certain way       
I’m often aware that I’m having a feeling, but I often don’t quite know what it 
is 
     
My behavior often puzzles me       
Thinking about my thoughts make me more confused       
Often I find it difficult to make sense of the way I feel about things       
I usually know why I feel the way I do       
 
 
I don’t often think about my thoughts       
I rarely spend time in refection       
I frequently examine my feelings       
I don’t really think about why I behaved in the way that I did       
I frequently take time to reflect on my thoughts       
I often think about the way I feel about things       
I am not really interested in analyzing my behavior      
It is important for me to evaluate the things that I do      
I am very interested in examining what I think about      
It is important to me to try to understand what my feelings mean      
I have a definite need to understand the way that my mind works      










On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "low" and 5 is "high," please rate how closely you believe in and 
adhere to each of the following theoretical orientations.   
 
1. I identify myself as psychoanalytic or psychodynamic in orientation 
 
Low     High 
2. I conceptualize my clients from a psychoanalytic or psychodynamic 
perspective 
      
3. I utilize psychoanalytic or psychodynamic methods       
4. I identify myself as existential in orientation       
5. I conceptualize my clients from an existential perspective       
6. I utilize existential methods       
7. I identify myself as cognitive or behavioral in orientation       
8. I conceptualize my clients from a cognitive or behavioral perspective       
9. I utilize cognitive or behavioral methods       
10. I identify myself as family systems in orientation       
11. I conceptualize my clients from a family systems perspective       
12. I utilize family systems methods       
13. I identify myself as feminist in orientation       
14. I conceptualize my clients from a feminist perspective       
15. I utilize feminist therapy techniques       
16. I identify myself as multicultural in orientation       
17. I conceptualize my clients from a multicultural perspective.       


















APPENDIX I. Demographic Questionnaire 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please complete the following items, either by clicking on your 
choice, or by typing in responses where appropriate. 
 
1) Gender:  ____Female   
             ____Male 
        ____Other (please specify) 
 
2) Age:  _____ 
 
 
3) Race/Ethnicity:  
____African-American    ____European-American 
____Asian/Pacific Islander   ____Hispanic/Latino 
____Native American    ____Middle Eastern 
____Biracial/multiracial     ____Other (Specify: ______) 
 
 
4) Please indicate the type of program you are currently enrolled. 
____Counseling Psychology Ph.D. program  
____Clinical Psychology Ph.D. program 
____Clinical Psychology Psy.D. program 
____College Student Personnel Ph.D. program 
____PsychologyMajor (Undergraduate)  
____Other (please specify) 
      ____ N/A 
 
5) What year of your program are you in? 
 ___1st year           ___5th year  
 ___2nd year            ___6th year 
 ___3rd year  ___7th + year 
 ___4th year 
 
6) Of which professional field are you a licensed member? 
      
     ____ Psychologist 
     ____ Social Work 
     ____ Counseling 
     ____ Other:  ______________________ 
 
 
7) How many years of experience as a counselor or therapist do you have?  _____ 
years 
 












APPENDIX K. CARD SORT SCORE SYNTAX 
TITLE ANALYSIS FOR K. LONDON DATA MANAGEMENT, SPRG 2010--
RUN03D. 
GET FILE='C:\KEVIN LONDON\SORTEXP1B.SAV'. 
/***************/ 
/** FILE  SORT **/ 
/***************/ 
SORT CASES BY IDENT NREC(D). 
/********************************************/ 
/** **/ 
/** INITIALIZING TOTAL 'POSSIBLE' SCORE **/ 




/** MATCH TOTALS **/ 
/*******************/ 
COMPUTE CLUSTSA = 0. 
COMPUTE CLUSTTN = 0. 
COMPUTE CLUSTCH = 0. 
COMPUTE CLUSTRP = 0. 
COMPUTE CLUSTNF = 0. 
/*******************/ 
/** MATCH SCORES **/ 
/*******************/ 
COMPUTE TCLUSTSA = 0. 
COMPUTE TCLUSTTN = 0. 
COMPUTE TCLUSTCH = 0. 
COMPUTE TCLUSTRP = 0. 
COMPUTE TCLUSTNF = 0. 
/********************************/ 
/** SUPPORT ASSESMENT CLUSTER **/ 
/** KEY IS: ITEM2 **/ 
/********************************/ 
/***************/ 
/** MATCHING **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (ITEM2 = ITEM2) CLUSTSA = CLUSTSA + 1. 
IF (ITEM2 = ITEM5) CLUSTSA = CLUSTSA + 1. 
IF (ITEM2 = ITEM6) CLUSTSA = CLUSTSA + 1. 
/***************/ 
/** SCORE **/ 
/** DIVIDEND **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (NCLUS EQ 1) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 1. 




IF (NCLUS EQ 3) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 4) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 5) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 5. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 6) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 7) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 8) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 2. 
IF (NCLUS GE 9) TCLUSTSA = CLUSTSA * 1. 
/********************************/ 
/** THERAPEUTIC WORK **/ 
/** KEY IS: ITEM9 **/ 
/********************************/ 
/***************/ 
/** MATCHING **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (ITEM9 = ITEM9) CLUSTTN = CLUSTTN + 1. 
IF (ITEM9 = ITEM10) CLUSTTN = CLUSTTN + 1. 
IF (ITEM9 = ITEM11) CLUSTTN = CLUSTTN + 1. 
IF (ITEM9 = ITEM12) CLUSTTN = CLUSTTN + 1. 
IF (ITEM9 = ITEM13) CLUSTTN = CLUSTTN + 1. 
/***************/ 
/** SCORE **/ 
/** DIVIDEND **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (NCLUS EQ 1) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 1. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 2) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 2. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 3) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 4) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 5) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 5. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 6) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 7) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 8) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 2. 
IF (NCLUS GE 9) TCLUSTTN = CLUSTTN * 1. 
/********************************/ 
/** CHANGE **/ 
/** KEY IS: ITEM14 **/ 
/********************************/ 
/***************/ 
/** MATCHING **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (ITEM14 = ITEM14) CLUSTCH = CLUSTCH + 1. 
IF (ITEM14 = ITEM15) CLUSTCH = CLUSTCH + 1. 
/***************/ 
/** SCORE **/ 
/** DIVIDEND **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (NCLUS EQ 1) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 1. 




IF (NCLUS EQ 3) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 4) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 5) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 5. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 6) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 7) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 8) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 2. 
IF (NCLUS GE 9) TCLUSTCH = CLUSTCH * 1. 
/********************************/ 
/** RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS **/ 
/** KEY IS: ITEM1 **/ 
/********************************/ 
/***************/ 
/** MATCHING **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (ITEM1 = ITEM1) CLUSTRP = CLUSTRP + 1. 
IF (ITEM1 = ITEM3) CLUSTRP = CLUSTRP + 1. 
IF (ITEM1 = ITEM16) CLUSTRP = CLUSTRP + 1. 
IF (ITEM1 = ITEM19) CLUSTRP = CLUSTRP + 1. 
/***************/ 
/** SCORE **/ 
/** DIVIDEND **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (NCLUS EQ 1) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 1. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 2) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 2. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 3) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 4) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 5) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 5. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 6) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 7) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 8) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 2. 
IF (NCLUS GE 9) TCLUSTRP = CLUSTRP * 1. 
/********************************/ 
/** NON-SPECIFIC FACTORS **/ 
/** KEY IS: ITEM4 **/ 
/********************************/ 
/***************/ 
/** MATCHING **/ 
/***************/ 
IF (ITEM4 = ITEM4) CLUSTNF = CLUSTNF + 1. 
IF (ITEM4 = ITEM7) CLUSTNF = CLUSTNF + 1. 
IF (ITEM4 = ITEM8) CLUSTNF = CLUSTNF + 1. 
IF (ITEM4 = ITEM17) CLUSTNF = CLUSTNF + 1. 
IF (ITEM4 = ITEM18) CLUSTNF = CLUSTNF + 1. 
/***************/ 
/** SCORE **/ 





IF (NCLUS EQ 1) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 1. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 2) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 2. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 3) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 4) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 5) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 5. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 6) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 4. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 7) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 3. 
IF (NCLUS EQ 8) TCLUSTNF = CLUSTNF * 2. 




/** THE PREVIOUS CODE CREATES SUMMARY VARIABLES THAT **/ 
/** REFLECT MATCHING AND SCORING OF CARD SORT WITH **/ 





/** SINGLE CASE AND ALL VARIABLES **/ 
/** ARE SAVED TO NEW SYSTEM FILE. **/ 
/************************************/ 
COMPUTE KEEP = 0. 
IF ($CASENUM EQ 1) KEEP = 1. 
IF (IDENT NE LAG(IDENT,1)) KEEP = 1. 
SELECT IF (KEEP = 1). 
SAVE OUTFILE='C:\KEVIN LONDON\SORTEXP1C.SAV' 
/DROP=IDOLD,SRTITEM. 
/*************/ 
/** PROCESS **/ 
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